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Abstract
In 2011, one of the authors (DJB) published a report of nine experiments in the 
 purporting to demonstrate that anJournal of Personality and Social Psychology
individual’s cognitive and affective responses can be influenced by randomly
selected stimulus events that do not occur until after his or her responses have
already been made and recorded, a generalized variant of the phenomenon
traditionally denoted by the term . To encourage replications, allprecognition
materials needed to conduct them were made available on request. We here
report a meta-analysis of 90 experiments from 33 laboratories in 14 countries
which yielded an overall effect greater than 6 sigma,  = 6.40, = 1.2 × 10z p 
with an effect size (Hedges’ ) of 0.09. A Bayesian analysis yielded a Bayesg
Factor of 5.1 × 10 , greatly exceeding the criterion value of 100 for “decisive
evidence” in support of the experimental hypothesis. When DJB’s original
experiments are excluded, the combined effect size for replications by
independent investigators is 0.06,  = 4.16,  = 1.1 × 10 , and the BF value isz p
3,853, again exceeding the criterion for “decisive evidence.” The number of
potentially unretrieved experiments required to reduce the overall effect size of
the complete database to a trivial value of 0.01 is 544, and seven of eight
additional statistical tests support the conclusion that the database is not
significantly compromised by either selection bias or by intense “p
-hacking”—the selective suppression of findings or analyses that failed to yield
statistical significance. -curve analysis, a recently introduced statisticalP
technique, estimates the true effect size of the experiments to be 0.20 for the
complete database and 0.24 for the independent replications, virtually identical
to the effect size of DJB’s original experiments (0.22) and the closely related
“presentiment” experiments (0.21). We discuss the controversial status of
precognition and other anomalous effects collectively known as .psi
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In 2011, the Journal of Personality and Social Psychology pub-
lished an article by one of us (DJB) entitled “Feeling the Future: 
Experimental Evidence for Anomalous Retroactive Influences on 
Cognition and Affect” (Bem, 2011). The article reported nine exper-
iments that purported to demonstrate that an individual’s cognitive 
and affective responses can be influenced by randomly selected 
stimulus events that do not occur until after his or her responses 
have already been made and recorded, a generalized variant of 
the phenomenon traditionally denoted by the term precognition. 
The controversial nature of these findings prompted the journal’s 
editors to publish an accompanying editorial justifying their deci-
sion to publish the report and expressing their hope and expecta-
tion that attempts at replication by other investigators would follow 
(Judd & Gawronski, 2011).
To encourage replications from the beginning of his research pro-
gram in 2000, Bem offered free, comprehensive packages that 
included detailed instruction manuals for conducting the experi-
ments, computer software for running the experimental sessions, 
and database programs for collecting and analyzing the data. As of 
September 2013, two years after the publication of his article, we 
were able to retrieve 69 attempted replications of his experiments 
and 11 other experiments that tested for the anomalous anticipation 
of future events in alternative ways. When Bem’s experiments are 
included, the complete database comprises 90 experiments from 33 
different laboratories located in 14 different countries.
Precognition is one of several phenomena in which individuals 
appear to have access to “nonlocal” information, that is, to infor-
mation that would not normally be available to them through any 
currently known physical or biological process. These phenomena, 
collectively referred to as psi, include telepathy, access to another 
person’s thoughts without the mediation of any known channel of 
sensory communication; clairvoyance (including a variant called 
remote viewing), the apparent perception of objects or events that 
do not provide a stimulus to the known senses; and precognition, 
the anticipation of future events that could not otherwise be antici-
pated through any known inferential process.
Laboratory-based tests of precognition have been published for 
nearly a century. Most of the earlier experiments used forced-choice 
designs in which participants were explicitly challenged to guess on 
each trial which one of several potential targets would be randomly 
selected and displayed in the near future. Typical targets included 
ESP card symbols, an array of colored light bulbs, the faces of a 
die, or visual elements in a computer display. When a participant 
correctly predicted the actual target-to-be, the trial was scored as a 
hit, and performance was typically expressed as the percentage of 
hits over a given number of trials.
A meta-analysis of all forced-choice precognition experiments 
appearing in English language journals between 1935 and 1977 was 
published by Honorton & Ferrari (1989). Their analysis included 
309 experiments conducted by 62 different investigators involv-
ing more than 50,000 participants. Honorton and Ferrari reported 
a small but significant hit rate, Rosenthal effect size z/?n = .02, 
Stouffer Z = 6.02, p = 1.1 × 10-9. They concluded that this over-
all result was unlikely to be artifactually inflated by the selective 
reporting of positive results (the so-called file-drawer effect), calcu-
lating that there would have to be 46 unreported studies averaging 
null results for every reported study in the meta-analysis to reduce 
the overall significance of the database to chance.
Just as research in cognitive and social psychology has increas-
ingly pursued the study of affective and cognitive processes that 
are not accessible to conscious awareness or control (e.g., Ferguson 
& Zayas, 2009), research in psi has followed the same path, mov-
ing from explicit forced-choice guessing tasks to experiments using 
subliminal stimuli and implicit or physiological responses. This 
trend is exemplified by several “presentiment” experiments, pio-
neered by Radin (1997) and Bierman (Bierman & Radin, 1997) in 
which physiological indices of participants’ emotional arousal are 
continuously monitored as they view a series of pictures on a com-
puter screen. Most of the pictures are emotionally neutral, but on 
randomly selected trials, a highly arousing erotic or negative image 
is displayed. As expected, participants show strong physiological 
arousal when these images appear, but the important “presentiment” 
finding is that the arousal is observed to occur a few seconds before 
the picture actually appears on the screen—even before the computer 
has randomly selected the picture to be displayed.
The presentiment effect has now been demonstrated using a vari-
ety of physiological indices, including electrodermal activity, 
heart rate, blood volume, pupil dilation, electroencephalographic 
activity, and fMRI measures of brain activity. A meta-analysis of 
26 reports of presentiment experiments published between 1978 
and 2010 yielded an average effect size of 0.21, 95% CI = [0.13, 
0.29], combined z = 5.30, p = 5.7 × 10-8. The number of unretrieved 
experiments averaging a null effect that would be required to reduce 
the effect size to a trivial level was conservatively calculated to be 
87 (Mossbridge et al., 2012; see also, Mossbridge et al., 2014). A 
critique of this meta-analysis has been published by Schwarzkopf 
(2014) and the authors have responded to that critique (Mossbridge 
et al., 2015).
Bem’s experiments can be viewed as direct descendants of the pre-
sentiment experiments. Like them, each of his experiments modi-
fied a well-established psychological effect by reversing the usual 
time-sequence of events so that the participant’s responses were 
obtained before the putatively causal stimulus events occurred. 
The hypothesis in each case was that the time-reversed version 
of the experiment would produce the same result as the standard 
non-time-reversed experiment. Four well-established psychologi-
cal effects were modified in this way. (See Bem (2011) for more 
complete descriptions of the experimental protocols.)
Precognitive approach and avoidance
Two experiments tested time-reversed versions of one of psy-
chology’s oldest and best known phenomena, the Law of Effect 
      Amendments from Version 1
Updated the P-Curve analysis and its discussion using the fourth 
version of the P-Curve algorithm, and updated Figure 2 to reflect 
this. We have also added the results of the BF robustness analysis 
related to the independent replications, and corrected a typo in 
the abstract related to the value of the overall BF. 
See referee reports
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(Thorndike, 1898): An organism is more likely to repeat responses 
that have been positively reinforced in the past than responses that 
have not been reinforced. Bem’s time-reversed version of this effect 
tested whether participants were more likely to make responses that 
would be reinforced in the near future. On each trial of the first 
experiment (“Precognitive Detection of Erotic Stimuli”), the par-
ticipant selected one of two curtains displayed side-by-side on a 
computer screen. After the participant had made a choice, the com-
puter randomly designated one of the curtains to be the reinforced 
alternative. If the participant had selected that curtain, it opened 
to reveal an erotic photograph and the trial was scored as a hit; 
if the participant had selected the other curtain, a blank gray wall 
appeared and the trial was scored as a miss. In a second experiment 
(“Precognitive Avoidance of Negative Stimuli”) a trial was scored 
as a hit if the participant selected the alternative that avoided the 
display of a gruesome or unpleasant photograph.
Retroactive priming
In recent years, priming experiments have become a staple of 
cognitive social psychology (Klauer & Musch, 2003). In a typi-
cal affective priming experiment, participants are asked to judge as 
quickly as they can whether a photograph is pleasant or unpleas-
ant and their response time is measured. Just before the picture 
appears, a positive or negative word (e.g., beautiful, ugly) is flashed 
briefly on the screen; this word is called the prime. Individuals typi-
cally respond more quickly when the valences of the prime and 
the photograph are congruent (both are positive or both are neg-
ative) than when they are incongruent. In the time-reversed ver-
sion of the procedure, the randomly-selected prime appeared after 
rather than before participants judge the affective valence of the 
photograph.
Retroactive habituation
When individuals are initially exposed to an emotionally arousing 
stimulus, they typically have a strong physiological response to it. 
Upon repeated exposures the arousal diminishes. This habituation 
process is one possible mechanism behind the so-called “mere 
exposure” effect in which repeated exposures to a stimulus pro-
duce increased liking for it (Bornstein, 1989; Zajonc, 1968). 
It has been suggested that if a stimulus is initially frightening 
or unpleasant, repeated exposures will render it less negatively 
arousing and, hence, it will be better liked after the exposures—
the usual mere exposure result—but if the stimulus is initially 
very positive, the repeated exposures will render it boring or less 
positively arousing and, hence, it will be less well liked after the 
exposures (Dijksterhuis & Smith, 2002).
In two time-reversed habituation experiments, pairs of negative 
photographs matched for equal likeability or pairs of erotic photo-
graphs similarly matched were displayed side by side on the screen 
and the participant was instructed on each trial to indicate which 
one he or she liked better. After the preference was recorded, the 
computer randomly selected one of the two photographs to be the 
habituation target and flashed it subliminally on the screen several 
times. The hypothesis was that participants would prefer the habitu-
ation target on trials with negative photographs but would prefer the 
nontarget on trials with erotic photographs.
The three time-reversed effects described above can be viewed as 
conceptual replications of the presentiment experiments in that 
all these experiments assessed affective responses to emotionally 
arousing stimuli before those stimuli were randomly selected and 
displayed. Whereas presentiment experiments assess physiological 
responses, Bem’s experiments assessed behavioral responses. Even 
the photographs used in the two kinds of experiments were drawn 
primarily from the same source, the International Affective Picture 
System (IAPS; Lang & Greenwald, 1993), a set of more than 800 
digitized photographs that have been rated for valence and arousal.
Retroactive facilitation of recall
A commonplace phenomenon of memory is that practicing or 
rehearsing a set of verbal items facilitates their subsequent recall. 
Two of Bem’s time-reversed experiments tested whether rehears-
ing a set of words makes them easier to recall even if the rehearsal 
takes place after the recall test is administered. Participants were 
shown 48 common nouns one at a time on the computer screen. 
They were then given a (surprise) recall test in which they were 
asked to type out all the words they could recall, in any order. After 
the participant completed the recall test, the computer randomly 
selected half the words to serve as practice words and had partici-
pants rehearse them in a series of practice exercises. The hypothesis 
was that this practice would “reach back in time” to facilitate the 
recall of these words and, thus, participants would recall more of the 
to-be-practiced words than the control non-practiced words.
This protocol is methodologically and conceptually quite different 
from the three time-reversed protocols described above. In those, 
participants were required to make quick judgments on each trial 
with no time to reflect on their decisions. The sequence of events 
within each trial occurred on a time scale of milliseconds and the 
putatively causal stimulus appeared immediately after each of the 
participant’s responses. In terms of Kahneman’s (2011) dual-mode 
theory of cognition—as described in his book, Thinking, Fast and 
Slow—these experiments required cognitive processing charac-
teristic of System 1, “Fast Thinking” (also see Evans, 2008, and 
Evans & Stanovich, 2013).
In contrast, the retroactive facilitation-of-recall protocol confronted 
participants with a single extended cognitive task that occurred on 
a time scale of minutes: Presenting the initial list of words took 
2-1/2 minutes; the recall test took up to 5 minutes; and the post-test 
practice exercises took approximately 7 minutes. This allowed par-
ticipants time to implement deliberate conscious strategies involv-
ing working memory, active rehearsal, and verbal categorization, all 
cognitive processes characteristic of System 2, “Slow Thinking.”
Across all his experiments, Bem reported a mean effect size (d) of 
0.22, with a Stouffer Z of 6.66, p = 2.68 × 10-11 (Bem et al., 2011).
Bem’s experiments have been extensively debated and critiqued. 
The first published critique appeared in the same issue of the journal 
as Bem’s original article (Wagenmakers et al., 2011). These authors 
argued that a Bayesian analysis of Bem’s results did not support 
his psi-positive conclusions and recommended that all research 
psychologists abandon frequentist analyses in favor of Bayesian 
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ones. Bem et al. (2011) replied to Wagenmakers et al., criticizing 
the particular Bayesian analysis they had used and demonstrating 
that a more reasonable Bayesian analysis yields the same conclu-
sions as Bem’s original frequentist analysis. In a similar critique, 
Rouder & Morey (2011) also advocated a Bayesian approach, criti-
cizing the analyses of both Bem and Wagenmakers et al. Rather 
than continuing to debate this issue in the context of Bem’s original 
experiments, we here analyze the current database with both a fre-
quentist analysis and the specific Bayesian analysis recommended 
by Rouder and Morey for meta-analyses.
Recently, Judd et al. (2012) have argued that psychologists should 
start treating stimuli statistically as a random factor the same way 
we currently treat participants. As they acknowledge, this would 
constitute a major change in practice for psychologists. To illus-
trate, they re-analyzed several published datasets from psychologi-
cal journals, including one of Bem’s retroactive priming results, 
showing that when stimuli are treated as a random factor the results 
are statistically weaker than reported in the original articles. They 
conclude that “As our simulations make clear, in many commonly 
used designs in social cognitive research, a likely consequence of 
only treating participants as a random effect is a large inflation of 
Type I statistical errors, well above the nominal .05 rate (p. 12).”
Francis (2012) and Schimmack (2012) take a different tack. Instead 
of arguing that Bem’s results are weaker than he reports, they argue 
that, on the contrary, his results are actually too good to be true. 
That is, given the statistical power of Bem’s effects, it is unlikely 
that eight of his nine experiments would have achieved statistical 
significance, implying that there is a hidden file-drawer of experi-
ments or failed statistical analyses that Bem failed to report.
In his own discussion of potential file-drawer issues, Bem (2011) 
reported that they arose most acutely in his two earliest experiments 
(on retroactive habituation) because they required extensive pre-
experiment pilot testing to select and match pairs of photographs and 
to adjust the number and timing of the repeated subliminal stimulus 
exposures. Once these were determined, however, the protocol was 
“frozen” and the formal experiments begun. Results from the first 
experiment were used to rematch several of the photographs used 
for its subsequent replication. In turn, these two initial experiments 
provided data relevant for setting the experimental procedures and 
parameters used in all the subsequent experiments.
As Bem’s explicitly stated in his article, he omitted one exploratory 
experiment conducted after he had completed the original habitua-
tion experiment and its successful replication. It used supraliminal 
rather than subliminal exposures. He noted that this fundamentally 
alters the participant’s phenomenology of the experiment, trans-
forming the task into an explicit ESP challenge and thereby under-
mining the very rationale for using an implicit response measure of 
psi in the first place. Even that experiment was not left languishing 
in a file drawer, however, because he had reported and critiqued it at 
a meeting of the Parapsychological Association (Bem, 2003).
With regard to unreported data analyses, Bem analyzed and reported 
each experiment with two to four different analyses, demonstrating 
in each case that the results and conclusions were robust across dif-
ferent kinds of analyses, different indices of psi performance, and 
different definitions of outliers. Following standard practice, how-
ever, he did not treat stimuli as a random factor in his analyses.
In his own critique, Francis (2012) remarks that “perhaps the most 
striking characteristic of [Bem’s] study is that [it meets] the cur-
rent standards of experimental psychology. The implication is that 
it is the standards and practices of the field that are not operating 
properly (p. 155).” Similarly, LeBel & Peters (2011) remark that 
“...[i]t is precisely because Bem’s report is of objectively high qual-
ity that it is diagnostic of potential problems with MRP [Modal 
Research Practice].... Bem has put empirical psychologists in a dif-
ficult position: forced to consider either revising beliefs about the 
fundamental nature of time and causality or revising beliefs about 
the soundness of MRP (p. 371).”
LeBel and Peters conclude by recommending that we should put a 
stronger emphasis on replication. We agree. Rather than continu-
ing to debate Bem’s original experiments, we seek in our meta-
analysis to answer the one question that most decisively trumps 
such disputes: Can independent investigators replicate the original 
experiments?
Method
The methodology and reporting of results comply with the Meta-
Analysis Reporting Standards (APA, 2008). Additional materials 
needed to replicate our results independently can be found at http://
figshare.com/articles/Meta-analysis_Implicit_Behavioral_Antici-
pation/903716.
Retrieval and coding of experiments
As noted above, the archival summary publication of Bem’s experi-
ments appeared in 2011, but he had begun his first experiments as 
early as 2000, and began reporting results soon thereafter at depart-
mental colloquia and annual meetings of the Parapsychological 
Association (Bem, 2003; Bem, 2005; Bem, 2008). Simultaneously 
he made materials available to anyone expressing an interest in try-
ing to replicate the experiments. As a result, attempted replications 
of the experiments began to appear as early as 2001 (as reported in 
Moulton & Kosslyn, 2011).
No presentiment experiments are included in our database because, 
as noted above, a meta-analysis of those has already been pub-
lished (Mossbridge et al., 2012). We have, however, included 19 
attempted replications of Bem’s Retroactive-Facilitation-of Recall 
experiment that had been previously meta-analyzed by Galak et al. 
(2012) because 8 additional replication studies of that protocol have 
been reported since then. (This was the only protocol included in 
Galak et al.’s. meta-analysis.)
Although the individual-difference variable of “stimulus seeking” 
emerged as a significant correlate of psi performance in several 
of Bem’s original experiments, we have not analyzed that vari-
able in the present meta-analysis because too few of the replica-
tions reported on it—especially those that modified Bem’s original 
protocol.
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Co-authors PT, TR, and MD conducted a search for all poten-
tially relevant replications that became available between the year 
2000 and September of 2013. These included unpublished reports 
as well as peer-reviewed, published articles in mainstream psy-
chological journals; specialized journals; proceedings from con-
ferences; and relevant studies found in Google Scholar, PubMed 
and PsycInfo. The same set of keywords—Bem, feeling the future, 
precognition— was used for all searches, and no MESH terms or 
Boolean operators were used. Using email and academia.edu, they 
also contacted known psi researchers and mainstream researchers 
who had expressed an interest in replicating Bem’s experiments. Of 
the ninety-three experiments retrieved, two were eliminated because 
they were severely underpowered: the first had only one participant; 
the second had nine (Snodgrass, 2011). A third experiment, report-
ing positive results, rested on several post-hoc analyses, and so we 
deemed it too exploratory to include in the meta-analysis (Garton, 
2010). The final database thus comprises 90 experiments.
Co-authors PT and TR independently coded and categorized each 
study with respect to the following variables: a) type of effect(s) 
tested; b) number of participants enrolled in the study; c) descrip-
tive or inferential statistics used to calculate measures of effect 
size; d) whether the replication had been conducted before or 
after the January, 2011 (Online First) publication of Bem’s origi-
nal experiments; e) whether or not the experiment had been peer-
reviewed; and f) type of replication.
For this last variable, each experiment was categorized into one 
of three categories: an exact replication of one of Bem’s experi-
ments (31 experiments), a modified replication (38 experiments), 
or an independently designed experiment that assessed the ability 
to anticipate randomly-selected future events in some alternative 
way (11 experiments). To qualify as an exact replication, the experi-
ment had to use Bem’s software without any procedural modifi-
cations other than translating on-screen instructions and stimulus 
words into a language other than English if needed. The eleven 
experiments that had not been designed to replicate any of Bem’s 
experiments included five retroactive-priming experiments and six 
retroactive-practice experiments.
Percentages of agreement for each of the coding variables ranged 
from a minimum of 90% for the statistical data to 100% for the clas-
sification into one of the three categories of experiments. Discrep-
ancies in coding were resolved by discussion between PT and TR.
Frequentist analysis
All the main inferential statistics, weighted effect-size point estima-
tions with corresponding 95% Confidence Intervals, and combined 
z values were calculated using the Comprehensive Meta-Analysis 
software v.2 by Borenstein et al. (2005). Effect sizes (Hedges’ g) 
and their standard errors were computed from t test values and 
sample sizes. (Hedges’ g, is similar to the more familiar d [Cohen, 
1988], but pools studies using n - 1 for each sample instead of n. 
This provides a better estimate for smaller sample sizes.) When 
t test values were not available, we used the effect sizes reported by 
the authors or estimated them from the descriptive statistics. When 
more than one dependent variable was measured, a single effect 
size was calculated by averaging the effect sizes obtained by the 
different t values.
Heterogeneity within each set of experiments using a particu-
lar protocol (e.g., the set of retroactive priming experiments) was 
assessed using I2 (Huedo-Medina et al., 2006). It estimates the 
percent of variance across studies due to differences among the true 
effect sizes. If all the studies are methodologically identical and the 
subject samples are very similar, then I2 will be small (< 25%) and a 
fixed-effect model analysis is justified; otherwise a random-effects 
model is used (Borenstein et al., 2009).
A fixed-effect model assumes that all the studies using a particu-
lar protocol have the same true effect size and that the observed 
variance of effect sizes across the studies is due entirely to random 
error within the studies. The random-effects model allows for the 
possibility that different studies included in the analysis may have 
different true effect sizes and that the observed variation reflects 
both within-study and between-study sampling error.
Bayesian analysis
A model comparison Bayesian analysis of an experiment pits a 
specified experimental hypothesis (H1) against the null hypoth-
esis (H0) by calculating the odds that H1 rather than H0 is true— 
p(H1)/p(H0)—or the reverse. The analysis assumes that each person 
comes to the data with a subjective prior value for these odds and 
then adjusts them on the basis of the data to arrive at his or her pos-
terior odds. A Bayesian analysis can be summarized by a number 
called the Bayes Factor (BF), which expresses the posterior odds 
independent of any particular individual’s prior odds. For example, 
a BF of 3 indicates that the observed data favor the experimental 
hypothesis over the null hypothesis by a ratio of 3:1. The posterior 
odds for a particular individual can then be calculated by multiply-
ing his or her prior odds by BF. For example, a mildly psi-skeptical 
individual might initially assign complementary probabilities of 
.2 and .8 to H1 and H0, respectively, yielding prior odds of .25. If 
BF = 3 then the Bayesian formula indicates that this individual’s 
posterior odds should be .75. If BF were to exceed 4, then the poste-
rior odds p(H1)/p(H0) would exceed 1, implying that this individual 
now favors the experimental hypothesis over the null.
Jeffreys (1998) has suggested the following verbal labels for inter-
preting BF levels of p(H1)/p(H0): 
BF = 1 – 3:         Worth no more than a bare mention
BF = 3 – 10:       Substantial evidence for H1 
BF = 10 – 30:     Strong evidence for H1 
BF = 30 – 100:   Very Strong evidence for H1 
BF > 100:           Decisive evidence for H1 
To perform a Bayesian analysis, one must also specify a prior prob-
ability distribution of effect sizes across a range for both H0 and 
H1. Specifying the effect size for H0 is simple because it is a single 
value of 0, but specifying H1 requires specifying a probability dis-
tribution across a range of what the effect size might be if H1 were 
in fact true. This specification can strongly impact the subsequent 
estimates of BF and, in fact, was the major disputed issue in the 
debate over Bem’s original experiments (Bem et al., 2011; Rouder 
& Morey, 2011; Wagenmakers et al., 2011).
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For purposes of meta-analysis, Rouder & Morey (2011) argue that 
one should use the Jeffrey, Zellner and Siow (JZS) prior probabil-
ity distribution (see, also, Bayarri & Garcia-Donato, 2007). That 
distribution is designed to minimize assumptions about the range 
of effect sizes and, in this sense, constitutes what is known as an 
“objective” prior (Rouder et al., 2009). Moreover, the resulting BF 
is independent of the measurement scale of the dependent variable, 
is always finite for finite data, and is consistent in the sense that 
as sample size increases, BF grows to infinity if the null is false 
and shrinks to zero if it is true—a consistency that does not obtain 
for p values. Researchers can also incorporate their expectations 
for different experimental contexts by tuning the scale of the prior 
on effect size (designated as r). Smaller values of r (e.g., 0.1) are 
appropriate when small effects sizes are expected; larger values of r 
(e.g., 1.0) are appropriate when large effect sizes are expected. As r 
increases, BF provides increasing support for the null.
For these several reasons, we have adopted the JZS prior probability 
distribution for our Bayesian analysis. For the estimation of Bayes 
Factors, we used the meta.ttest function of the BayesFactor pack-
age (Morey & Rouder, 2014). In the expectation that the effect size 
will be small, we set r = 0.1. To estimate the overall effect size 
and ?2, a measure of between-studies variance, we employed the 
DiMaggio (2013) script, which uses the R2jags package to run the 
“BUGS” program (Bayesian Analysis Using Gibb’s Sampling). 
This provides a Monte Carlo Markov Chain simulation approach to 
parameter estimation using a normally distributed prior with a mean 
of 0.1 and a wide variance of 105. The program chooses samples 
using either Gibbs or Metropolis Hasting algorithms. Because this 
is a simulation-based approach, we repeated many draws or itera-
tions and evaluated whether the chain of sample values converged 
to a stable distribution, which was assumed to be the posterior dis-
tribution in which we are interested.
We ran two 20,000 Markov Chain Monte Carlo iterations, each 
starting with different and dispersed initial values for the model. We 
based our results on the final 20,000 iterations and assessed whether 
the chain of values had converged to a stable posterior distribution 
by monitoring and assessing a graph of the chain and by calculating 
the Brooks Gelman and Rubin statistic, a tool within the CODA 
package of R programs for this purpose. The results are presented 
as mean values of the posterior distributions and their 95% credible 
intervals (CrI).
Results and discussion
The complete database comprises 90 experiments conducted 
between 2001 and 2013. These originated in 33 different laborato-
ries located in 14 countries and involved 12,406 participants. The 
full database with corresponding effect sizes, standard errors, and 
category assignments is presented in Table S1 along with a forest 
plot of the individual effect sizes and their 95% confidence intervals.
Dataset 1. Table S1
http://dx.doi.org/10.5256/f1000research.7177.d105136 
Experiments in the meta-analysis, N, task type, effect size, standard 
error, peer-review and replication classifications (Tressoldi et al., 2015).
The first question addressed by the meta-analysis is whether the 
database provides overall evidence for the anomalous anticipation 
of random future events. As shown in the first and second rows of 
Table 1, the answer is yes: The overall effect size (Hedges’ g) is 
0.09, combined z = 6.33, p = 1.2 × 10-10. The Bayesian BF value 
is 5.1 × 109, greatly exceeding the criterion value of 100 that is 
considered to constitute “decisive evidence” for the experimental 
hypothesis (Jeffreys, 1998). Moreover, the BF value is robust across 
a wide range of the scaling factor r, ranging from a high value of 
5.1 × 109 when we set r = 0.1 to a low value of 2.0 × 109 when r = 1.0.
The second question is whether independent investigators can suc-
cessfully replicate Bem’s original experiments. As shown in the 
third and fourth rows of Table 1, the answer is again yes: When 
Table 1. Meta-analytic results for all experiments and for independent replications of Bem’s experiments.
Number of 
experiments
Number of 
participants
Effect size 
(Hedges’ g)
95%CI or 
Crl
Combined z or 
Bayes factor
p  
(One-tailed)
I2 ?2 
All experimentsa 
    Bayesian analysis
90 12,406 0.09 
0.08
[0.06, 0.11] 
[0.02, 0.15]
z = 6.33 
BF = 5.1×109 
1.2 × 10-10 41.4 .005 
.028
Independent replicationsb 
    Bayesian analysis
69 10,082 0.06 
0.07
[0.03, 0.09] 
[0.01, 0.14]
z = 4.16 
BF = 3,853
1.2 × 10-5 36.1 .004 
.035
Exact replications 
Modified replications
31 
38
2,106 
7,976
0.08 
0.05
[0.02, 0.13] 
[0.02, 0.09]
z = 2.90 
z = 3.00
.0018 
.0013
31.7 
38.9
.007 
.004
Pre-2011 replications 
Post-2011 replications
30 
39
2,193 
7,889
0.09 
0.05
[0.04, 0.15] 
[0.02, 0.08]
z = 3.20 
z = 2.88
.0007 
.004
39.5 
32.3
.009 
.003
Peer reviewed 
Not peer reviewed
35 
34
7,477 
2,605
0.06 
0.06
[0.02, 0.10] 
[0.02, 0.10]
z = 2.93 
z = 3.21
.0017 
.0007
51.4 
  8.7
.001 
.006
Note. In a Bayesian analysis, the analogue to the 95%CI is Crl, “credible intervals of the posterior distributions.” I2 is an estimate of the percent of variance 
across studies due to differences among the true effect sizes. ?2 is the between-studies variance.
a Assuming a null ES of .01 and a variance of .005 (the observed variance, ?2, in the random-effects model), the statistical power of this meta-analysis is 
0.95 (Hedges & Pigott, 2001).
b These analyses exclude Bem’s own experiments and the eleven experiments that had not been designed as replications of those experiments.
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Bem’s experiments are excluded, the combined effect size for 
attempted replications by other investigators is 0.06, z = 4.16, 
p = 1.1 × 10-5, and the BF value is 3,853, which again greatly exceeds 
the criterion value of 100 for “decisive evidence.” A robustness anal-
ysis shows that the BF value ranges from the 3,853, quoted above, 
when the r parameter is set to .01, to 992 when r is set to 1.0.
The fifth and sixth rows of Table 1 show that the mean effect sizes of 
exact and modified replications are each independently significant 
and not significantly different from each other (Mean diff = 0.025; 
95% CI [-0.04, 0.09]; z = 0.87, ns).
The seventh and eighth rows show that the mean effect sizes of 
replications conducted before and after the January, 2011 (online) 
publication of Bem’s article are each independently significant and 
not significantly different from each other (Mean diff = 0.042; 95% 
CI [.02, 0.10]; z = 0.37, ns).
And finally, the bottom two rows of Table 1 show that the mean 
effect sizes of peer reviewed and not-peer-reviewed replications are 
each independently significant and identical to each other.
Table 2 displays the meta-analysis of the complete database as a 
function of experiment type and divided post-hoc into fast-thinking 
and slow-thinking protocols.
As shown in Table 2, fast-thinking protocols fared better than 
slow-thinking protocols: Every fast-thinking protocol individually 
achieved a statistically significant effect, with an overall effect size 
of 0.11 and a combined z greater than 7 sigma. In contrast, slow-
thinking experiments achieved an overall effect size of only 0.03, 
failing even to achieve a conventional level of statistical signifi-
cance (p = .16).
One possible reason for the less successful performance of the slow-
thinking experiments is that 12 of the 27 attempted replications of 
Bem’s retroactive facilitation of recall experiment were modified 
replications. The 15 exact replications of that protocol yielded an 
overall effect size of 0.08, but the 12 modified replications yielded 
a null effect size (-0.00). For example, Galak et al. (2012) used their 
own software to conduct seven of their 11 modified replications in 
which 87% of the sessions (2,845 of 3,289 sessions) were con-
ducted online, thereby bypassing the controlled conditions of the 
laboratory. These unsupervised sessions produced an overall effect 
size of -0.02. Because experiments in a meta-analysis are weighted 
by sample size, the huge N of these online experiments substan-
tially lowers the mean effect size of the replications: When the 
online experiments are removed, the mean ES for this protocol rises 
to 0.06 [0.00, 0.12]; z = 1.95, p = .05.
Nevertheless, we still believe that it is the fast/slow variable itself 
that is an important determinant of the lower success rate of the slow-
thinking experiments. In particular, we suspect that fast-thinking 
protocols are more likely to produce evidence for psi because 
they prevent conscious cognitive strategies from interfering with 
the automatic, unconscious, and implicit nature of psi functioning 
(Carpenter, 2012). This parallels the finding in conventional psy-
chology that mere exposure effects are most likely to occur when 
the exposures are subliminal or incidental because the participant 
is not aware of them and, hence, is not prompted to counter their 
attitude-inducing effects (Bornstein, 1989).
Finally, Table 2 reveals that the clear winner of our meta-analytic 
sweepstakes is the precognitive detection of erotic stimuli (row 1), 
the time-reversed version of psychology’s time-honored Law of 
Effect. The fourteen experiments using that protocol— conducted 
in laboratories in four different countries—achieve a larger effect 
Table 2. Meta-analytic results as a function of protocol and experiment type.
Experiment Type Number of 
experiments
Number of 
participants
Effect 
size
95%CI Combined z p 
(One-tailed)
I2 
Fast-thinking protocols
Precognitive detection of 
reinforcement 14 863 0.14
a [0.08, 0.21] 4.22 1.2 × 10-5 19.0
Precognitive avoidance of 
negative stimuli 8 3,120 0.09 [0.03, 0.14] 3.10 .002 50.5
Retroactive priming 15 1,154 0.11 [0.03, 0.21] 2.85 .003 42.0
Retroactive habituation 20 1,780 0.08a [0.04, 0.13] 3.50 .0002 24.6
Retroactive practice 4 780 0.11a [0.04, 0.18] 3.03 .002 00.0
All fast-thinking experiments 61 7,697 0.11 [0.08, 0.14] 7.11 5.8 × 10-13 31.6
Slow-thinking protocols
Retroactive facilitation of 
practice on recall 27 4,601 0.04 [-0.01, 0.09] 1.66 .10 38.3
Retroactive facilitation of 
practice on text reading 
speed
2 108 -0.10 [-0.40, 0.20] -0.65 .51 61.0
All slow-thinking experiments 29 4,709 0.03 [-0.01, 0.08] 1.38 .16 39.7
a Fixed-effect model
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size (0.14), a larger combined z (4.22), and a more statistically sig-
nificant result (p = 1.2 × 10-5) than any other protocol in the Table. 
This protocol was also the most reliable: If we exclude the three 
experiments that were not designed to be replications of Bem’s 
original protocol, 10 of the 11 replication attempts were success-
ful, achieving effect sizes ranging from 0.12 to 0.52. The one 
exception was a replication failure conducted by Wagenmakers 
et al. (2012), which yielded a non-significant effect in the unpre-
dicted direction, ES = -0.02, t(99) = -0.22, ns. These investigators 
wrote their own version of the software and used a set of erotic 
photographs that were much less sexually explicit than those used 
in Bem’s experiment and its exact replications.
The results of our meta-analysis do not stand alone. As we noted in 
the introduction, Bem’s experiments can be viewed as conceptual 
replications of the presentiment experiments in which participants 
display physiological arousal to erotic and negative photographs 
a few seconds before the photographs are selected and displayed 
(Mossbridge et al., 2012). The parallel is particularly close for the 
two protocols testing the precognitive detection of erotic stimuli 
and the precognitive avoidance of negative stimuli (Protocols 1 
and 2 in Table 2). Together those two protocols achieve a combined 
effect size of 0.11, z = 4.74, p = 1.07 × 10-6.
File-drawer effects: Selection bias
Because successful studies are more likely to be published than unsuc-
cessful studies—the file-drawer effect—conclusions that are drawn 
from meta-analyses of the known studies can be misleading. To help 
mitigate this problem, the Parapsychological Association adopted 
the policy in 1976 of explicitly encouraging the submission and pub-
lication of psi experiments regardless of their statistical outcomes. 
Similarly, we put as much effort as we could in locating unpublished 
attempts to replicate Bem’s experiments by contacting both psi and 
mainstream researchers who had requested his replication packages 
or had otherwise expressed an interest in replicating the experiments. 
As we saw in Table 1, this all appears to have had the desired effect 
on the current database: Peer-reviewed experiments yielded the same 
results as experiments that were not peer-reviewed.
There are also several statistical techniques for assessing the extent 
to which the absence of unknown studies might be biasing a meta-
analysis. We consider nine of them here.
Fail-safe calculations
One of the earliest of these techniques was the calculation of a 
“Fail-Safe N,” the number of unknown studies averaging null results 
that would nullify the overall significance level of the database if 
they were to be included in the meta-analysis (Rosenthal, 1979). The 
argument was that if this number were implausibly large, it would 
give us greater confidence in the conclusions based on the known 
studies. The Rosenthal Fail-Safe N, however, has been criticized as 
insufficiently conservative because it does not take into account the 
likely possibility that unpublished or unretrieved studies might well 
have a mean non-zero effect in the unpredicted direction. Thus the 
estimate of the Fail-Safe N is likely to be too high. (For the record, 
the Rosenthal Fail-Safe N for our database is greater than 1,000.)
An alternative approach for estimating a Fail-Safe N focuses on the 
effect size rather than the p value (Orwin, 1983). The investiga-
tor first specifies two numbers: The first is an average effect size 
for missing studies which, if added to the database, would bring 
the combined effect size under a specified “trivial” threshold—the 
second number that must be specified. If we set the mean effect size 
of missing studies at .001 and define the threshold for a “trivial” 
effect size to be .01, then the Orwin Fail-Safe N for our database 
is 544 studies. That is, there would have to be 544 studies miss-
ing from our database with a mean effect size of .001 to reduce its 
overall effect size to .01.
Correlations between study size and effect size
Another set of indices for assessing selection bias are various 
correlational measures for assessing the relationship between the 
size of a study and its effect size. The most direct is the Begg and 
Mazumdar’s rank correlation test, which simply calculates the rank 
correlation (Kendall’s tau) between the variances or standard errors 
of the studies and their standardized effect sizes (Rothstein et al., 
2005). If this correlation is significantly negative, if small under-
powered studies have larger effect sizes than larger studies, then 
there is reason to suspect the presence of publication or retrieval 
bias in the database. For our database, Kendall’s tau is actually 
slightly positive: ? = +0.10; z = 1.40, implying that our database is 
not seriously biased by a selection bias.
More recent publications (e.g., Jin et al., 2015; Rücker et al., 2011; 
Schwarzer et al., 2010; Stanley & Doucouliagos, 2014; Stanley & 
Doucouliagos, 2015) have urged the adoption of more complex 
indices of selection bias: 
1.  The Copas method (Copas, 2013; Schwarzer et al., 2010) is 
based on two models, the standard random effects model and 
the selection model, which takes study size into account.
2.  The Limit meta-analysis (Schwarzer et al., 2014) is an 
extended random effects model that takes account of possible 
small-study effects by allowing the treatment effect to depend 
on the standard error.
3.  The Precision Effect Test (PET, Stanley, 2008; Stanley & 
Doucouliagos, 2014) is a variant of the classical Egger regres-
sion test (Sterne & Egger, 2005), which tests the relationship 
between study size and effect size.
4.  The Weighted Least Squares analysis (Stanley & Doucouliagos, 
2015) provides estimates that are comparable to random 
effects analyses when there is no publication bias and are 
identical to fixed-effect analyses when there is no heterogene-
ity, providing superior estimates compared with both conven-
tional fixed and random effects analyses.
Table 3 summarizes the results of applying these four additional 
tests to our database. 
As Table 3 shows, three of the four tests yield significant effect 
sizes estimates for our database after being corrected for poten-
tial selection bias; the PET analysis is the only test in which 
the 95% confidence interval includes the zero effect size. As 
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Sterne & Egger (2005) themselves caution, however, this proce-
dure cannot assign a causal mechanism, such as selection bias, to 
the correlation between study size and effect size, and they urge 
the use of the more noncommittal term “small-study effect.”
Trim and fill
Currently the most common method for estimating the number of 
studies with low effect sizes that might be missing from a data-
base is Duval & Tweedie’s (2000) Trim-and-Fill procedure. It is 
based on a graphic display of the correlation between sample size 
and effect size called the “funnel” plot, which plots a measure of 
sample size on the vertical axis as a function of effect sizes on the 
horizontal axis. The funnel plot for our database is displayed in 
Figure 1, which uses the reciprocal of the standard error as the 
measure of sample size.
If a meta-analysis has captured all the relevant experiments, we 
would expect the funnel plot to be symmetric: Experiments should 
be dispersed equally on both sides of the mean effect size. If the 
funnel plot is asymmetric, with a relatively high number of small 
experiments falling to the right of the mean effect size and relatively 
few falling to the left, it signals the possibility that there may be 
experiments with small or null effects that actually exist but are 
missing from the database under consideration.
Table 3. Copas method, Limit meta-analysis, Precision Effect Test and 
Weighted least squares results for the overall and the “fast-thinking” 
database.
Test Effect size 
estimate 95%CI
Copas method
Overall 0.08 [0.05, 0.10]
Fast-thinking 0.07 [0.03, 0.10]
Limit meta-analysis
Overall 0.05 [0.02, 0.08]
Fast-thinking 0.05 [0.01, 0.10]
Precision Effect Test (PET)
Overall 0.01 [-0.04, 0.05]
Fast-thinking 0.03 [-0.03, 0.08]
Weighted Least Squares
Overall 0.06 [0.04, 0.09]
Fast-thinking 0.09 [0.06, 0.12]
Figure 1. Funnel Plot of the observed studies (white circles) and the imputed missing studies (black circles) under a random-effects 
model.
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Using an iterative procedure, the trim-and-fill method begins by 
trimming experiments from the extreme right end of the plot (i.e., 
the smallest studies with the largest effect sizes) and then calculat-
ing a new mean effect size. It then reinserts the trimmed studies on 
the right and inserts their imputed “missing” counterparts symmetri-
cally to the left of the new mean effect size. This produces a revised, 
more symmetric funnel plot centered around the newly revised mean 
effect size. This process continues until the funnel plot becomes 
symmetric. At that point, the plot is centered around a final cor-
rected estimate of the effect size and displays the number of imputed 
“missing” experiments to the left of the unbiased mean effect size.
Figure 1 displays the funnel plot for our complete database after 
it has been modified by the trim-and-fill procedure. The unfilled 
diamond under the horizontal axis marks the original observed 
effect size (0.09, see Table 1) and the black diamond marks the 
corrected estimate of the effect size: 0.07 [0.04, 0.10]. The unfilled 
circles identify the 90 actual experiments in the meta-analysis; the 
black circles identify the imputed missing experiments. As Figure 1 
shows, there are only eight potentially missing studies. As noted 
above, the Orwin Fail-Safe estimate of how many missing experi-
ments with low effect sizes would be required to nullify the overall 
effect size of the database is 544.
P-curve analysis
All the analyses discussed above presume that selection bias is 
driven by effect-size considerations, but Simonsohn et al. (2014a); 
Simonsohn et al. (2014b) have argued that it is actually more likely 
to be driven by the p = .05 significance level. They have also demon-
strated empirically that the trim and fill procedure is inadequate for 
estimating the true effect size present in the database (2014b). In its 
place, they and other authors (van Assen et al., 2015) have recently 
proposed a very different approach called p-curve analysis.
P-curve is the distribution of significant (p < .05) results among 
the experiments in a meta-analysis. “It capitalizes on the fact that 
the distribution of significant p values... is a function of the true 
underlying effect. Researchers armed only with sample sizes and 
test results of the published findings can correct for publication 
bias (Simonsohn et al., 2014b, p. 666).” In addition to assessing 
selection bias, p-curve analysis can also assess the presence of 
“p-hacking,” questionable practices of selective reporting that ille-
gitimately enable an investigator to claim results that meet the 
coveted p < .05 threshold (Simonsohn, et al., 2014a; Simonsohn, 
et al., 2014b).
In our database, 17 (19%) of the 90 studies reported results that 
were statistically significant at the .05 level. The solid blue line in 
Figure 2 displays the p-curve distribution of those studies, using 
Simonsohn et al’s (2015) revision of their algorithm.
The dotted horizontal red line (“Null of zero effect”) is the distri-
bution expected if there is no effect in the data. In that case, 5% 
of the significant p values will be below .05, 4% will be below 
.04, 3% will be below .03, 2% will be below .02, and 1% will be 
below .01. Thus there will be as many p values between .04 and .05 
as between .00 and .01, and the shape of the p-curve is a uniform, 
straight horizontal line with 20% of the significant values within 
each of the 5 intervals on the horizontal-axis. If a genuine non-zero 
effect exists, however, then p-curve’s expected distribution will be 
right-skewed: 
We expect to observe more low significant p values (p < .01) 
than high significant p values (.04 < p < .05) (Simonsohn 
et al., 2014b, pp. 666–667)... A set of significant findings con-
tains evidential value when we can rule out selective reporting 
as the sole explanation of those findings. Only right-skewed 
Figure 2. Distribution of the significant p values across experiments in the meta-analysis.
Page 11 of 33
F1000Research 2016, 4:1188 Last updated: 29 JAN 2016
p-curves... are diagnostic of evidential value. P-curves that are 
not right-skewed suggest that the set of findings lacks evidential 
value, and curves that are left-skewed suggest the presence of 
intense p-hacking (Simonsohn et al., 2014a, p. 535).
The p-curve displayed in Figure 2 is significantly right-skewed 
(Binomial test: p = .024; Continuous test: z = -1.97, p = .024), dem-
onstrating that our database contains evidential value that is not 
compromised by intense p-hacking. A similar conclusion emerges 
from an analysis using “p-uniform,” the p-curve algorithm intro-
duced by Van Assen et al. (2015) which directly tests the degree 
to which the observed curve differs from the “no-effect” uniform 
distribution. It confirms that there is a significant effect in our data-
base (p = .005) and no evidence for selection bias (p = .86). (If there 
is a substantial amount of heterogeneity in the meta-analysis, this 
method should be used as a sensitivity analysis.) 
In their updated 2015 discussion of p-curve analysis, Simonsohn 
et al. address the special case of “ambitious” p-hacking, in which 
an investigator hacks beyond the .05 level by either dropping higher 
p values (.025 > p > .05) or replacing them with lower ones, thereby 
increasing the odds of a significant right-skew. To test for this, they 
propose a more stringent test for demonstrating evidential value by 
requiring that the “half p-curve,” the distribution of p < .025 results, 
to be right-skewed as well.
that is the case, Simonsohn et al. (2014a) propose applying a sec-
ond test to determine if the observed p-curve is significantly flatter 
than the “Null of 33% power”—depicted by the dashed green line 
in Figure 2. If it is, then that is affirmative evidence that the p-curve 
actually does lack evidential value. Under that test, our database 
(z = 1.13, p = .13). In other words, our database passes the test for 
not being compromised by “intense” p-hacking, but is inconclusive 
in determining whether “ambitious” p-hacking has compromised 
the half p-curve.
In sum, eight of the nine statistical tests we have applied to our 
database support the conclusion that its overall statistical signifi-
cance has not been compromised by either selection bias or by 
p-hacking.
P-curve and the true effect size
One of the counterintuitive derivations from p-curve analysis—
confirmed by extensive simulations—is that when the distribution 
of significant p values is right-skewed, the inclusion of studies with 
nonsignificant p levels (p > .05) in a meta-analysis actually underes-
timates the true effect size in the database (Simonsohn et al., 2014b). 
Based on the Simonsohn et al. p-curve analysis, the estimate of the 
true effect size for our full database is 0.20; for the 69 independent 
replications, the true effect size is 0.24. These are virtually identical 
to the mean effect size of Bem’s (2011) original experiments (0.22) 
and the mean effect size of the presentiment experiments (0.21) 
(Mossbridge et al., 2012).
The complementary merits of exact and modified replications
Our meta-analysis reveals that both exact and modified replications 
of Bem’s experiments achieve significant and comparable success 
rates (Table 1). This is reassuring because the two kinds of replica-
tion have different advantages and disadvantages. When a replica-
tion succeeds, it logically implies that every step in the replication 
“worked.” When a replication fails, it logically implies that at least 
one or more of the steps in the replication failed—including the 
possibility that the experimental hypothesis is false—but we do 
not know which step(s) failed. As a consequence, even when exact 
replications fail, they are still more informative than modified rep-
lications because they dramatically limit the number of potential 
variables that might have caused the failure.
There is, of course, no such thing as a truly exact replication. For 
example, the experimenter’s attitudes and expectations remain 
uncontrolled even in a procedurally exact replication, and there 
are now more than 345 experiments demonstrating that experi-
menter attitudes and expectations can produce belief-confirming 
results, even in simple maze experiments with rats as subjects 
(Rosenthal & Rubin, 1978).
Exact replications also serve to guard against some of the ques-
tionable research practices that can produce false-positive results, 
such as changing the protocol or experimental parameters as the 
experiment progresses, selectively reporting comparisons and cov-
ariates without correcting for the number examined, and selectively 
presenting statistical analyses that yielded significant results while 
omitting other analyses that did not (Simmons et al., 2011). By 
defining an exact replication in our meta-analysis as one that used 
Bem’s experimental instructions, software, and stimuli, we ensure 
that the experimental parameters and data analyses are all specified 
ahead of time. In other words, an exact replication is a publicly 
available, pre-specified protocol that provides many of the same 
safeguards against false-positive results that are provided by the 
preregistration of planned experiments.
Despite the merits of exact replications, however, they cannot 
uncover artifacts in the original protocol that may produce false pos-
itive results, whereas suitably modified replications can do exactly 
that by showing that an experiment fails when a suspected artifact 
is controlled for. Modified replications can also assess the general-
ity of an experimental effect by changing some of the parameters 
and observing whether or not the original results are replicated. For 
example, the one failed replication of the erotic stimulus detec-
tion experiment (Wagenmakers et al., 2012) had substituted mild, 
non-explicit erotic photographs for the more explicit photographs 
used in Bem’s original experiment and its exact replications.
As we noted in the introduction, Judd et al. (2012) have recently 
suggested that psychologists should begin to treat stimuli statisti-
cally as a random factor the same way we currently treat partici-
pants. This would constitute a way of testing the generalizability 
of results in psychological experiments. This would, however, 
also represent a major change in current practice in psychology, 
and none of the experiments in our database treated stimuli as a 
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Under this test for “ambitious” p-hacking,  our  database  does  not
satisfy their criterion for evidential value (z = .077,  p = .22).  When
does not satisfy the criterion for a lack of evidential value either
random factor. Nevertheless, some generality of stimuli used in 
Bem’s experimental protocols is achieved. In those involving erotic 
photographs, for example, different stimulus sets are used for men 
and women and all participants are given the choice of viewing 
opposite-sex or same-sex erotica. Experiments using words as 
stimuli (e.g., retroactive priming experiments) were successfully 
replicated in languages other than English.
The fact that exact and modified replications of Bem’s experi-
ments produced comparable, statistically significant results thus 
implies generality across stimuli, protocols, subject samples, and 
national cultures. Moreover, the different protocols can themselves 
be viewed as conceptual replications of the overarching hypothesis 
that individuals are capable of anomalously anticipating random 
future events.
General discussion
As Bem noted in his original 2011 article, psi is a controversial 
subject, and most academic psychologists do not believe that psi 
phenomena are likely to exist. A survey of 1,188 college profes-
sors in the United States revealed that psychologists were much 
more skeptical about psi than respondents in the humanities, 
the social sciences, or the physical sciences, including physics 
(Wagner & Monnet, 1979). Although this survey is now several 
years old, many psi researchers have observed that psychologists 
continue to be the most psi-skeptical subgroup of academics.
As Bem further noted, there are, in fact, justifiable reasons for 
the greater skepticism of psychologists. Although our colleagues 
in other disciplines would probably agree with the oft-quoted dic-
tum that “extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence,” we 
psychologists are more likely to be familiar with the methodological 
and statistical requirements for sustaining such claims and aware of 
previous claims that failed either to meet those requirements or to 
survive the test of successful replication. Even for ordinary claims, 
our conventional frequentist statistical criteria are conservative: The 
p = .05 threshold is a constant reminder that it is worse to assert that 
an effect exists when it does not (the Type I error) than to assert 
that an effect does not exist when it does (the Type II error). (For a 
refreshing challenge to this view, see Fiedler et al., 2012).
Second, research in cognitive and social psychology over the past 
40 years has sensitized us psychologists to the errors and biases 
that plague intuitive attempts to draw valid inferences from the data 
of everyday experience (e.g. Gilovich, 1991; Kahneman, 2011). 
This leads us to give virtually no weight to anecdotal or journalistic 
reports of psi, the main source cited in the survey by our colleagues 
in other disciplines as evidence for their more favorable beliefs 
about psi.
One sobering statistic from the survey was that 34% of psycholo-
gists in the sample asserted psi to be impossible, more than twice 
the percentage of all other respondents (16%). Critics of Bayesian 
analyses frequently point out the reductio ad absurdum case of the 
extreme skeptic who declares psi or any other testable phenomenon 
to be impossible. The Bayesian formula implies that for such a 
person, no finite amount of data can raise the posterior probability 
in favor of the experimental hypothesis above 0, thereby conferring 
illusory legitimacy on the most anti-scientific stance. More realisti-
cally, all an extreme skeptic needs to do is to set his or her prior 
odds in favor of the psi alternative sufficiently low so as to rule out 
the probative force of any data that could reasonably be proffered.
Which raises the following question: On purely statistical grounds, 
are the results of our meta-analysis strong enough to raise the pos-
terior odds of such a skeptic to the point at which the psi hypothesis 
is actually favored over the null, however slightly?
An opportunity to calculate an approximate answer to this ques-
tion emerges from the Bayesian critique of Bem’s original experi-
ments made by Wagenmakers et al. (2011). Although they did not 
explicitly claim psi to be impossible, they came very close by set-
ting their prior odds at 1020 against the psi hypothesis. As shown 
in Table 1, the Bayes Factor for our database is approximately 109 
in favor of the psi hypothesis, which implies that our meta-analysis 
should lower their posterior odds against the psi hypothesis to 1011. 
In other words, our “decisive evidence” falls 11 orders of magni-
tude short of convincing Wagenmakers et al. to reject the null. (See 
a related analysis of their prior odds in Bem et al., 2011.) Clearly 
psi-proponents have their work cut out for them.
Beyond this Bayesian argument, a more general reason that many 
psychologists may find a meta-analysis insufficiently persua-
sive is that the methodology of meta-analysis is itself currently 
under intense re-examination, with new procedural safeguards 
(e.g. preregistration of all included studies) and statistical proce-
dures (e.g., treating stimuli as a random factor, p-curve analysis) 
appearing almost monthly in the professional literature. Even 
though our meta-analysis was conceived and initiated prior to many 
of these developments, we were able to make use of many of them 
after the fact, (e.g., p-curve analysis) but not others (e.g., preregis-
tration, stimuli treated as a random factor). We thus hope that other 
researchers will be motivated to follow up with additional experi-
ments and analyses to confirm, disconfirm, or clarify the nature of 
our findings.
Perhaps the most reasonable and frequently cited argument for 
being skeptical about psi is that there is no explanatory theory or 
proposed mechanism for psi phenomena that is compatible with 
current physical and biological principles. Indeed, this limitation is 
implied by the very description of psi as “anomalous,” and it pro-
vides an arguably legitimate rationale for imposing the requirement 
that the evidence for psi be “extraordinary.”
We would argue, however, that this is still not a legitimate rationale 
for rejecting proffered evidence a priori. Historically, the discov-
ery and scientific exploration of most phenomena have preceded 
explanatory theories, often by decades (e.g., the analgesic effect of 
aspirin; the anti-depressant effect of electroconvulsive therapy) or 
even centuries (e.g., electricity and magnetism, explored in ancient 
Greece as early as 600 BC, remained without theoretical explana-
tion until the Nineteenth Century). The incompatibility of psi with 
our current conceptual model of physical reality may say less about 
psi than about the conceptual model of physical reality that most 
non-physicists, including psychologists, still take for granted—but 
which physicists no longer do.
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As is widely known, the conceptual model of physical reality 
changed dramatically for physicists during the 20th Century, when 
quantum theory predicted and experiments confirmed the exist-
ence of several phenomena that are themselves incompatible with 
our everyday Newtonian conception of physical reality. Some psi 
researchers see sufficiently compelling parallels between certain 
quantum phenomena (e.g., quantum entanglement) and character-
istics of psi to warrant considering them as potential mechanisms 
for psi phenomena (e.g., Broderick, 2007; Radin, 2006). Moreo-
ver, specific mechanisms have been proposed that seek to explain 
psi effects with theories more testable and falsifiable than simple 
metaphor (e.g., Bierman, 2010; Maier & Buechner, 2015; Walach 
et al., 2014). A recent collection of these theories is presented in 
May & Marwaha (2015).
Although very few physicists are likely to be interested in pursuing 
explanations for psi, the American Association for the Advancement 
of Science (AAAS) has now sponsored two conferences of physi-
cists and psi researchers specifically organized to discuss the extent 
to which precognition and retrocausation can be reconciled with 
current or modified versions of quantum theory. The proceedings 
have been published by the American Institute of Physics (Sheehan, 
2006; Sheehan, 2011). A central starting point for the discussions 
has been the consensus that the fundamental laws of both classical 
and quantum physics are time symmetric: 
They formally and equally admit time-forward and time-reversed 
solutions.... Thus, though we began simply desiring to predict 
the future from the present, we find that the best models do not 
require—in fact, do not respect—this asymmetry.... [Accord-
ingly,] it seems untenable to assert that time-reverse causation 
(retrocausation) cannot occur, even though it temporarily runs 
counter to the macroscopic arrow of time (Sheehan, 2006, p. vii).
Ironically, even if quantum-based theories of psi eventually do 
mature from metaphor to genuinely predictive models, they are still 
not likely to provide intuitively satisfying descriptive mechanisms 
for psi because quantum theory itself fails to provide such mecha-
nisms for physical reality. Physicists have learned to live with that 
conundrum in several ways. Perhaps the most common is simply to 
ignore it and attend only to the mathematics and empirical findings 
of the theory—derisively called the “Shut Up and Calculate” school 
of quantum physics (Kaiser, 2012).
As physicist and Nobel Laureate Richard Feynman (1994) advised, 
“Do not keep saying to yourself... ‘but how can it be like that?’ 
because you will get...into a blind alley from which nobody has yet 
escaped. Nobody knows how it can be like that (p. 123).”
Meanwhile the data increasingly compel the conclusion that it 
really is like that.
Perhaps in the future, we will be able to make the same statement 
about psi.
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The research article “Feeling the future: A meta-analysis of 90 experiments on the anomalous anticipation
of random future events” by Daryl Bem, Patrizio Tressoldi, Thomas Rabeyron, Michael Duggan raises the
fundamental problem: if “nonlocal” anticipation really exists. In his original research Bem (2011)
constructed several experimental designs that could indicate time-reversed cognitive and emotional
effects similar to well-known and approved in psychology (approach and avoidance, priming, habituation,
facilitation of recall).
 
Bem’s innovation to experimental approach in “psi” research is quite prominent because he started to use
several methods based not on so-called force-choice. Thus, implicit drives and motivators started playing
a role in results. For example, in experiments on “retroactive approach and avoidance” not the fact of
guessing by itself is estimated, but the percentage of pictures with some similar content that may
actualize similar emotions and drives in most people.
 
More generally, it is proved that intuition and anticipation are more effective and frequent in situations with
lack of time and/or information for decision-making (Vasilieva, 2006). In special computer games with
unpredicted results based on usage of random number generators we can see notable effect in guessing,
especially in first 20 attempts (Li, 1992) while interest is high enough.
 
In present article, when Bem’s results excluded, the effect size became lesser (combined effect size for
attempted replications by other investigators is 0.06, z = 4.16, p = 1.1 × 10 ). I do not think as a majority
of sceptics, that Bem could select best results anyhow. For my opinion, it may be because Bem’s
participants were the students – mostly young people with higher sex drive according to age and social
status. In our recent investigation (Grigoriev, Vasilieva, 2015) we got similar results (to Bem’s) within
young men (they guessed erotic photos more frequently), but results were opposite for men of higher age
(they “guessed” erotic pictures significantly rarer than expected).
 
Really, Bem based his research, in particular, on thesis that participants should be attracted by erotic
pictures and move away from unpleasant pictures. Thus, generally we follow our drives or motivations
when select photos like we could see the “images of the future” or some contented hints from the future. If
we even accept this fantastic assumption, we should remember than each individual is characterized by
own structure of needs and psychological defenses, more over they depend from actual psychological
and physiological state. So, relatively small effect size may be caused also by total averaging of
participants. If we select participants to be similar in some respect, for example, men in prison or students
under severe risk of expelling from university, we get more effect size (Grigoriev, Vasilieva, 2015),
because real majority of participants were in similar and specific stress situations.
-5
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under severe risk of expelling from university, we get more effect size (Grigoriev, Vasilieva, 2015),
because real majority of participants were in similar and specific stress situations.
 
Underlying hypothesis about retroactive influence of future events on psyche and physiological state of
individual seems to be reasonable in general, although we know nothing about physical mechanisms of
such influence except of some metaphors from quantum physics like “nonlocality” on “entanglement”…
Still entangled particles are interconnected not only in space, but also in time… Again, there is a place for
strong discussion between different physicists. We do not know actually, if entanglement could be
enough lasting and existing at high temperatures, and consist enough amount of information within
particles like photons, for example.
 
Nevertheless, an argument that it is not worth to study something, only because nobody knows the
mechanism of phenomenon, seems to be improper. At least, on the stage of exploratory researches.
Moreover, skeptics’ arguments that anticipation of unpredictable events has no any sense for an
organism is unqualified. Theory of functional systems of Pyotr Anokhin (Anokhin, 1973) is one of
keystones of biology, like the meaning of anticipation (Lomov and Surkov, 1980; Lomov, 1984) for
psychological adaptation.
 
We should care only about reproducibility. Yes, there are some difficult problems with reproducibility in
investigations of psi in general. Although I do not think that retroactive influence of future events is “psi” at
all. We do not know delicate physical and psychological mechanism that may work and provide quite
small, but significant effect-size. One could offer at least several ways to overcome such weak
reproducibility: 1. We should use longitude (during many days and repeats) for every participant and take
into account different variables like physiological state and outer influences like weather, social events
etc. 2. Parallel registration of processes in nervous system (McCraty, 2004; Mossbridge et al, 2012;
Bierman & Scholte, 2002) to distinguish specific patterns in physiological processes when anomalous
perception of unpredictable future events is successful. 3. Higher motivation on success or failure
avoidance in participants. 4. Taking into account specific needs and state of every participant that may
cause differences of unconscious setting to get the specific results.
 
Of course, this research is still quite odd for traditional psychology and may need some extraordinary
evidences. At least authors provide us by enough statistical evidences of effects. The sources of possible
artifacts were reviewed on the stages of data collecting, experimental methods and statistical analysis. It
is worth to mention, that both Bayesian analysis and effect-size with statistical significance indices are
enough high even after elimination of all “suspicious” data.
 
For my opinion, article may be published, because obtained positive results about possibility of
anomalous retroactive influence reflect some unknown nonlocal mechanism that acts through time and
can be felt by psyche and/or organism. It sounds weird; but we should remember every revolution in
science had started from such odd facts, that incorporated then into the new theory…
 
And, as for the problem of weak reproducibility of results, the main strategy here should be the searching
for the highly reproducible factors that cause variability of phenomenon. When we discover the reasons of
nonreproducibility – thus we could understand a structure of phenomenon better.
I have read this submission. I believe that I have an appropriate level of expertise to confirm that
it is of an acceptable scientific standard.
 No competing interests were disclosed.Competing Interests:
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 Ina Vitalevna Vasileva
Department of General and Social Psychology, Tyumen State University, Tyumen, Russian Federation
The article describes the results of meta-analysis 90 experiments performed to check is whether the
anomalous anticipation of random future events exist. These results were obtained in 33 different
laboratories located in 14 countries and involved 12.406 participants. Daryl Bem initially constructed and
realized 4 types of experiments: 1. Precognitive Approach and Avoidance; 2. Retroactive Priming; 3.
Retroactive Habituation; 4. Retroactive Facilitation of Recall. In each type of experiment, an influence of
time-reserved effects was checked. An effect-size in researches included is enough to support the
hypothesis about anomalous anticipation of random future events.
Online experiments revealed less successful comparing with traditional experiments with experimenter.
Authors suppose that lesser effect-size in online-experiments is caused by inability to control all
experimental conditions. I believe that it is an adequate explanation of differences in effect in online and
laboratory experiments.
Authors discussed a possible influence of experimenter’s belief in psi. It agrees with some hypothetical
ideas of “quantum consciousness”. Unfortunately, for three time-reserved experiments (1. Precognitive
Approach and Avoidance; 2. Retroactive Priming; 3. Retroactive Habituation) such characteristics as
valence and arousal for erotic and unpleasant photographs (The International Affective Picture System)
were not described. We could estimate obtained results differential characteristics of participants (gender,
age, social status). Particularly, in our recent research (Grigoriev, Vasilieva, 2015) we have obtained the
results concerning relationship between such characteristics as a gender, age, satisfaction of basic needs
and specific of affective visual stimuli anticipation (similar to “Precognitive Approach and Avoidance” type
of experiment described in article and also using stimuli from IAPS) in cohorts of students (men and
women), law-abiding and convicted of violent crimes men.
Authors also discussed the differences in effect-size between «fast-thinking» and «slow-thinking»
strategies. They suggest that fast/slow variable effects on result of psi. From one side I agree with this
experimental fact and conclusion, because «fast-thinking», as authors say, «prevent conscious cognitive
strategies», although still suppose that detailed research is necessary to continue in respect to these
variables, because participants’ strategies may be caused not only with the speed of operation with
stimuli, but also with content of stimuli.
This article may be accepted for indexing because of its proper methodological and methodical level.
Enough variables that may affect psi were taken in consideration.
I have read this submission. I believe that I have an appropriate level of expertise to confirm that
it is of an acceptable scientific standard.
 No competing interests were disclosed.Competing Interests:
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Author Response 19 Jan 2016
, Dipartimento di Psicologia Generale, Università di Padova, ItalyPatrizio Tressoldi
Authors’ Responses to Comments on Version 1
 
:Reply to Lakens
 
We appreciate Lakens’ posting of his review of the version of the article that we originally submitted to 
. has the unusual policy of rejecting any article that fails to receiveFrontiers in Psychology Frontiers 
unanimous endorsement from all reviewers. Two previous reviewers had endorsed our article for
publication and the Associate Editor was preparing to publish it when a general editor of insistedFrontiers 
that she seek yet another reviewer. That other reviewer turned out to be Lakens. Our article was then
rejected and we never had the opportunity to revise our article in response to his review.
 
Therefore, in preparing our submission to , we tried to be responsive to Lakens’ concerns.F1000Research
In particular, we added to our analysis several additional statistical procedures that tested for selection
bias in our database. As we note in our published article, only one of the 9 tests, the PET analysis Lakens
cited in his review, included the zero effect size within its 95% confidence interval. We are pleased that
Lakens now agrees that his original emphasis on that one analysis was too conservative. Even though we
continue to disagree with his conclusions about our results, we appreciate both his respectful tone and the
due diligence he displayed in his review and correspondence with us.
 
One of Lakens’ criticisms of our article was the “lack of a theoretical framework.” Ironically, psi researchers
are simultaneously criticized for presenting psi data without an explanatory theory and for proposing
theories of psi before establishing that they have data requiring explanation. Because our article is a
meta-analysis, the emphasis is necessarily on the data. Note, however, that our General Discussion
section lists several recent references that discuss substantive theoretical models that go well beyond
metaphor and hand-waving in trying to accommodate psi phenomena.
 
Reply to Schwarzkopf:
 
We thank Schwarzkopf for spotting the error in the Abstract reporting the Bayes Factor (BF) for our
database. The correct value (5.1 × 10  ) was the one displayed in our Table 1. We have now corrected that
error in Version 2 of our article.
 
In Version 2 of our article, we have also adopted Schwarzkopf’s suggestion that we report the robustness
of the Bayes Factor across different ranges of the scaling factor  for the 69 independent replications ofr
Bem’s experiments. As noted there, the BF ranges from 3,853 when  is set to 0.1 (the value shown inr
Table 1) to a low of 992 when  is set to 1.0.r
 
Regarding the outcome differences between Bem's original experiments and those reported in the
meta-analysis, we discuss at length the differences between fast- and slow-thinking protocols reported in
Table 2. Although the attempted replications of Bem’s slow thinking experiment on retroactive recall do not
achieve statistical significance, the  replications of that protocol do. More generally, -curve analysisexact p
estimates the true overall effect size of the independent replications of Bem’s experiments to be 0.24,
virtually identical to the effect size of his original experiments: 0.22.
 
Finally, as we note in both Versions 1 and 2 of our article, we agree with Schwarzkopf that research should
now move to independent preregistered experiments, and current efforts in that direction are now
9
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Finally, as we note in both Versions 1 and 2 of our article, we agree with Schwarzkopf that research should
now move to independent preregistered experiments, and current efforts in that direction are now
underway.
 
Reply to Bierman:
 
Bierman’s comment, with its bold headline “ is the most puzzling of the publishedFailed Replication” 
comments. It, too, focuses on the difference in the effect sizes observed in the meta-analysis and those
observed in Bem’s original experiments.
 
We were already aware of Bierman’s critique because he had previously posted it to a private online
Listserv forum of psi researchers. When we queried him at that time about why he hadn’t discussed the
crucial curve analysis—which, as noted above, affirms the comparability of our meta-analytic results andp-
Bem’s original results—he acknowledged that he had not read about our -curve analysis because he hadp
not read beyond page 9 of our 22-page article before preparing his comments. He also
acknowledged—and apologized for—overlooking the summary of that same analysis in our Abstract.
 
We understand that postings to Listserv forums are often quite informal and frequently contain errors of
omission and commission. As with email messages generally, the “Send” button is often pressed
prematurely. But what is puzzling and discomforting about Bierman’s comment in this current forum is that
he has simply reproduced his original posting without correcting his omission of our -curve analysis.p
 
curve analysis is quite new, and its validity, utility, implementation, and interpretation are certainly openP-
to challenge. As we note in Version 2 of our article, the algorithm for performing the analysis is already in
its fourth iteration. Bierman might well find grounds to question our use of it. But we respectfully ask that he
read about it before stating “Failed Replication.”
 These are comments submitted on behalf of all authorsCompeting Interests:
Reader Comment 08 Jan 2016
, UCL Experimental Psychology & Institute of Cognitive Neuroscience, UKD. Sam Schwarzkopf
Another, brief comment after I had some additional time to look at the study:
The abstract states that the Bayes factor in support of the alternative hypothesis for the full meta-analysis
is 1.4 x 10^9. This is actually lower than what is reported in the text of the paper where it is given at 5.1 x
10^9, which is the Bayes factor obtained with a Cauchy scaling factor of r=0.1. For the smaller scaling
factor tested, r=1, the Bayes factor is 2 x 10^9, so still larger than what is reported in the abstract.
Presumably this is a typo that should be corrected?
More importantly, how does the robustness analysis look when Bem's own data are excluded? For the
standard prior chosen for the main analysis the BF is 3,853, so approximately one millionth of what it is
when his data are included. Considering that there is such a stark discrepancy in the effect sizes of his
experiments (mean g=0.22) and all the other experiments (mean g=0.08; something Dick Bierman's
comment above also discusses), a difference that is in fact significant ((t(88)=2.75, p=0.007, BF10=6.045),
and the general controversy around these experiments, more attention should be paid to independent
(ideally, preregistered) experiments.
 No competing interests were disclosed.Competing Interests:
Page 22 of 33
F1000Research 2016, 4:1188 Last updated: 29 JAN 2016
F1000Research
Reader Comment 06 Jan 2016
, Eindhoven University of Technology, NetherlandsDaniel Lakens
Review of Feeling the Future: A Meta-analysis of 90 Experiments on the Anomalous Anticipation
 of Random Future Events by Bem, Tressoldi, Rabeyron, & John Duggan.
This is a review I wrote for Frontiers, where the manuscript was not accepted for publication. I would now
change the stress I put on the PET analysis - it may be too conservative. But the other points remain, and
should be sufficient to not take the current meta-analysis as scientific evidence of pre-cognition.
I have previously looked at this meta-analysis for a blog post I’ve written (Lakens, 2014, 
). I had a veryhttp://daniellakens.blogspot.nl/2014/05/a-pre-publication-peer-review-of-meta.html
professional exchange with the authors, which was pleasurable and interesting, and led the authors to
correct the mistakes I pointed out and answer some questions I had. I thought it was interesting to peer
review an article that had been posted in a public depository. 
Now, my task is different, according to the Frontiers review guidelines: “The mandate for review editors is
to ensure that the results are valid, the analysis is flawless and the quality as high as possible” In the
review below, I take this task very seriously, and regret to have to conclude that the results are not valid,
the analyses are flawed in many respects, and the quality is too low for this meta-analysis to be part of the
scientific literature. I believe this manuscript should be rejected. 
Let me be clear that I would have no problem with a well-performed meta-analysis of this literature,
regardless of whether it would show a meta-analytic effect size estimate that differed from zero or not. In
science, we distinguish between statistical inferences and theoretical inferences (e.g., Meehl, 1990). Even
if a meta-analysis would lead to the statistical inference that there is a signal in the noise, there is as of yet
no compelling reason to draw the theoretical inference that psi exists, due to the lack of a theoretical
framework as acknowledged by the authors. So, a meta-analytical effect size estimate that differs from
zero would have to lead to a careful examination of possible confounds in the paradigms that have been
used in this literature, and the studies that have been included in this meta-analysis. Such a careful
examination has not been done. Therefore, the validity of the measures used to examine psi effects has
not been established. Only 18 statistically significant effects have been observed in the last 14 years, as
the literature search by the authors reveals, coming from only 7 labs. Only if confounds are sufficiently
excluded (preferably in direct replications in different labs) can we start thinking about alternative
explanations for the observed data, such as psi. In other words, even if there was robust evidence for a
meta-analytic effect size estimate that differed from zero in our statistical inferences, we are far removed
from being able to draw any theoretical inferences. If research on psi has demonstrated anything, it is that
when you lack a theoretical model, scientific insights are gained at a painstakingly slow pace, if they are
gained at all. 
Before we accept the conclusion in the manuscript (and abstract) that there is an overall effect size of 0.09,
we need to check whether the meta-analysis has been performed adequately, and whether bias has
influenced this meta-analytic effect size estimate.  
 Dealing with publication bias. 
The authors use Begg and Mazumdar’s rank correlation test to examine publication bias, stating that: “The
preferred method for calculating this is the Begg and Mazumdar’s rank correlation test, which calculates
the rank correlation (Kendall’s tau) between the variances or standard errors of the studies and their
standardized effect sizes (Rothstein, Sutton & Borenstein, 2005).” 
I could not find this recommendation in Rothstein ., 2005). From the same book, chapter 11, p. 196,et al
about the rank correlation test: 
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I could not find this recommendation in Rothstein ., 2005). From the same book, chapter 11, p. 196,et al
about the rank correlation test: 
Sterne and Egger (Chapter 6) caution against using the test unless the meta-analysis includes a range of
study sizes, including at least one of ‘medium’ size. Otherwise, the result will be driven primarily by noise.
They also note that the test has low power unless there is severe bias, and so a non-significant tau should
not be taken as proof that bias is absent (see also Sterne ., 2000, 2001b, c) et al
Similarly, from the Cochrane handbook of meta-analyses (
http://handbook.cochrane.org/chapter_10/10_4_3_1_recommendations_on_testing_for_funnel_plot_asymmetry.htm
): 
“The test proposed by Begg and Mazumdar (Begg 1994) has the same statistical problems but lower
power than the test of Egger ., and is therefore not recommended.” et al
When the observed effect size is tiny (as in the case of the current meta-analysis), just a small amount of
bias can yield a small meta-analytic effect size estimate that is statistically different from 0. In other words,
whereas a significant test result is reason to worry, a non-significant test result is not reason not to worry.
Also note how the Cochrane handbook suggests Egger’s test to be a superior alternative (I will show below
that meta-regressions shows that correcting for publication bias, the meta-analytic effect size is not
significantly different from 0).  
The authors also report the trim-and-fill method to correct for publication bias. It is known that when
publication bias is induced by a value boundary, rather than an effect size boundary, and there isp-
considerable heterogeneity in the effects included in the meta-analysis, the trim-and-fill method might not
perform well enough to yield a corrected meta-analytic effect size estimate that is close to the true effect
size (Peters, Sutton, Jones, Abrams, & Rushton, 2007; Terrin, Schmid, Lau, & Olkin, 2003).  
 
Similarly, from the Cochrane handbook (
):  http://handbook.cochrane.org/chapter_10/10_4_4_2_trim_and_fill.htm
 
“The trim and fill method requires no assumptions about the mechanism leading to publication bias,
provides an estimate of the number of missing studies, and also provides an estimated intervention effect
‘adjusted’ for the publication bias (based on the filled studies). However, it is built on the strong assumption
that there should be a symmetric funnel plot, and there is no guarantee that the adjusted intervention effect
matches what would have been observed in the absence of publication bias, since we cannot know the
true mechanism for publication bias. Equally importantly, the trim and fill method does not take into
account reasons for funnel plot asymmetry other than publication bias. Therefore, ‘corrected’ intervention
effect estimates from this method should be interpreted with great caution. The method is known to
perform poorly in the presence of substantial between-study heterogeneity(Terrin 2003, Peters 2007).
Additionally, estimation and inferences are based on a dataset containing imputed intervention effect
estimates. Such estimates, it can be argued, inappropriately contribute information that reduces the
uncertainty in the summary intervention effect.” 
 
The authors nevertheless assume the trim-and-fill methods provides an indication that publication bias is
not a problem, and present a ‘corrected’ effect size estimate. However, the corrected effect size is
completely untrustworthy.  
 
 Better tests for publication bias
The authors present fail-safe N, Begg and Mazumdar’s rank correlation test, and the trim-and-fill method.
All these tests should be removed from the manuscript, or at the very best added to supplementary
materials and only cursory discussed within the manuscript itself, pointing out they do not tell us much. I
know they are often used, but we can hardly use the continued mistakes of others as an excuse to follow
scientifically invalid practices. The author's justification that trim-and-fill ‘is currently the most common
method for estimating the number of missing studies in a meta-analysis’ is therefore akin to admitting you
are using a statistical tool that is known not to work well, because most others are using that technique as
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are using a statistical tool that is known not to work well, because most others are using that technique as
well. Researchers often attempt to justify the inclusion of these measures when they give favorable results,
but no justification is possible. I think reporting the fail-safe  in the abstract is very misleading, especiallyN
given that most people in the world (psychologists included) don’t understand statistics very well, and will
misinterpret it. After removing rank correlation, trim-and-fill, and fail-safe N, present contour enhanced
funnel plots, instead of the normal funnel plots in the manuscript (e.g., Figure 1), also in the appendices. 
While the authors are interested in using more novel tests (e.g., curve analyses) they do not use updatedp-
versions of Eggers regression to examine publication bias, namely PET-PEESE meta-regression, even
though this seems to be the best test to examine publication bias we currently have. This approach is
based on first using the precision-effect test (PET, Stanley, 2008) to examine whether there is a true effect
beyond publication bias, and then follow up on this test (if the confidence intervals for the estimate exclude
0) by a PEESE (precision-effect estimate with standard error, (Stanley and Doucouliagos, 2007) to
estimate the true effect size. 
In the R code where I have reproduced the meta-analysis, I have included the PET-PEESE
meta-regression. The results are clear: the estimated effect size without publication bias is 0.008, and the
confidence intervals around this effect size estimate do not exclude 0. In other words, there is no good
reason to assume that anything more than publication bias is going on in this meta-analysis.  
 
Call: 
lm(formula = d.all ~ d.se.all, weights = 1/d.v.all) 
 
Weighted Residuals: 
    Min      1Q  Median      3Q     Max  
-2.0032 -0.7251  0.2041  0.6933  1.6760  
 
Coefficients: 
            Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)    
(Intercept) 0.008344   0.021571   0.387  0.69984    
d.se.all    0.548656   0.178451   3.075  0.00281 ** 
--- 
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1 
 
Residual standard error: 0.8882 on 88 degrees of freedom 
Multiple R-squared:  0.097,Adjusted R-squared:  0.08674  
F-statistic: 9.453 on 1 and 88 DF,  value: 0.002808 p-
 
> confint(SE.all) 
                  2.5 %     97.5 % 
(Intercept) -0.03452504 0.05121256 
d.se.all     0.19402280 0.90328951 
 
Using the best technique available today to examine the correlation between ‘study sizes and effect sizes’
(the authors should use ‘standard errors and effect sizes’) we thus have to conclude the positive overall
effect size is due to publication bias. I think this article should clearly specify that there is no effect of psi in
a meta-analysis over 90 studies in the abstract, and that there is therefore no scientific evidence for the
presence of psi. Publishing this article with any other conclusion in the abstract would be misleading. I
understand the authors might need some time to adjust to this conclusion, now that they have been
provided with a statistical technique they might not have heard of, but when they examine this technique in
more detail, they will undoubtedly come to the conclusion that their meta-analysis indicates the most likely
meta-analytic effect size estimate their data provides is a psi effect of 0.  
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meta-analytic effect size estimate their data provides is a psi effect of 0.  
Perhaps it will help to realize that if psi had an effect size of Cohen’s dz = 0.09, to have 90% power to
examine an effect with an effect size estimate of 0.09, an alpha level of 0.05, and performing a two-sided
t-test, you’d need 1300 participants. Only 1 experiment has been performed with a sufficiently large
sample size (Galak, exp 7), and this experiment did not show an effect. Meier (study 3) has 1222
participants, and finds an effect at a significance level of 0.05. However, using a significance level of 0.05
is rather silly when sample sizes are so large (see 
) and when wehttp://daniellakens.blogspot.nl/2014/05/the-probability-of-p-values-as-function.html
calculate a Bayes Factor using the -value and the sample size, we see this results in a JZS Bayes Factort
of 1.90 – nothing that should convince us. 
library(BayesFactor) 
1/exp(ttest.tstat(t=2.37, n1=1222, rscale = 0.707)[['bf']]) 
 
[1] 1.895727 
 
I hope the authors will realize that a meta-analysis of primarily random noise mixed with publication bias
can hardly be expected to provide convincing support of psi effects. The authors would do better to
perform two or three pre-registered studies using a sample size of around 1300 participants, and
repeatedly show there is an effect in the paradigm they use (even though this would not immediately mean
the effect is related to psi). 
 Estimating the evidential value with p-curve and p-uniform.
The authors report two analyses to examine the effect size based on the distribution of values. Thesep-
techniques are new, and although it is great the authors embrace these techniques, they should be used
with caution. For example, a new version of the curve app has just been released, which uses a slightlyp-
different calculation of the critical tests, and slightly different labels for the tests that are performed. The R
code for the uniform technique has only recently been made available to a select number of scholars (Ip-
have access to the code) but lacks documentation and has not been carefully compared with other
techniques, such as curve, PET-PEESE, etc. – just to show these techniques are still being developed.  p-
The new test of the curve app return a statistically significant effect when testing for right skew, orp-
evidential value. However, it now also includes an exploration of how much this test result depends on a
single value, but plotting the significance levels of the test if the  most extreme values are removed.p- k p-
As we see in the graph below, the test for evidential value returns a value above 0.05 after excludingp-
only 1 value, which means we cannot put a lot of confidence in these results. p-
  
I also think it is important to note that I have already uncovered many coding errors in a previous blog post
(Lakens, 2014), even though the authors note that 2 authors independently coded the effect sizes. I feel I
could keep pointing out more and more errors in the meta-analysis (instead, I will just repeatedly
recommend to include a real statistician as a co-author), but let’s add one to illustrate how easily the
conclusion in the current curve analysis changes. The authors include Bierman and Bijl (2013) in theirp-
spreadsheet. The raw data of this experiment is shared by Bierman and Bijl (and available at: 
 - another excellent example of openhttps://www.dropbox.com/s/j44lvj0c561o5in/Main%20datafile.sav
science), and I can see that although Bierman and Bijl exclude one participant for missing data, the
reaction times that are included in the meta-analysis are not missing. Instead, the data from the Human
Information Processing questionnaire participants performed after the reaction time study is missing.
Indeed, in the master thesis itself (Bijl & Bierman, 2013 
 ), all reaction time datahttp://www.uniamsterdam.nl/D.J.Bierman/PUBS/2013/Bijl_Bierman_PA2013.docx
is included. If I reanalyze the data, I find the same result as in the master thesis: 
 
I don’t think there can be much debate about whether all reaction time data should have been included,
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I don’t think there can be much debate about whether all reaction time data should have been included,
and I think that the choice to report reaction time data from 67 instead of 68 participants in one of those tiny
sources of bias that creep into the decisions researchers almost unconsciously make (after all, the results
were statistically significant from zero regardless of the final choice). However, for the curve analysisp-
(which assumes authors stop their analysis when values are smaller than 0.05) this small differencep-
matters. If we include t(67)=2.11 in the curve analysis instead of (67)=2.59, the new curve test nop- t p-
longer indicates the studies have evidential value.  
On a final note, it should be pointed out that the correct degrees of freedom in the results used by Bem and
colleagues should be 66 and not 67 (because they use the data of 67, not 68 participants). Bierman and
Bijl (2013) correctly report the degrees of freedom themselves, but Bem and colleagues initially had
included the correct test (e.g., in the version of the meta-analysis I reviewed on my blog). They later
followed Bierman and Bijl (2013) by using the test performed on 67 instead of 68 participants, changing
the -value and value, but forgetting to change the degrees of freedom. I want to point out that such at p-
strategic selection of the lowest possible value (by whoever is finally responsible for introducing thisp-
bias) is not in line with an assumption of the curve test (which assumes people stop selectively reportingp-
whatever gives them a p < 0.05). This example demonstrates this is not always the case. 
 
One problem with new techniques is that researchers might not understand them. The authors have asked
the authors of the uniform papers to perform an analysis on their data, and conclude: “For our database, p-
uniform confirms that there is, in fact, a significant effect in our database (p = .005) and that there is nop-
evidence for selection bias (p = .857).” I delved in this new technique (and would like to thank Robbie van
Aert and Marcel van Assen for their help), and quickly learned that in principle the test against a uniform
distribution should be the same for a curve and uniform analysis. The reason they differ in thep- p-
manuscript is because the two tests were calculated based on different assumptions. uniform isP-
calculated based on the idea that all reported tests were one-sided. The values for all tests are thereforep-
half as large in the uniform test (e.g., p = 0.007) than in the curve test (e.g., p = 0.014). The test isp- p-
performed on a larger subset of the data (29 instead of 17 studies). The differences between the tests are
not based on the differences in the data, but in the way the data is used and the decisions about the test
that are made. I think this nicely illustrates the authors often lack sufficient understanding of the statistical
techniques they use. They need to cooperate with a real statistician if the want to perform a meta-analysis
that should be taken seriously by the researcher community.  
The new version of the curve test shows there is evidential value. But instead of mindlessly interpretingp-
the values we get from the analyses, let’s first look at the plot of our data. We see a very weird valuep- p-
distribution that would not be predicted. There are many more values between 0.01-0.02 then betweenp-
0.00-0.01. Under typical circumstances, we should see many, many more values below 0.01 thanp-
between 0.01-0.02 (e.g., Lakens, 2014).  
 
Remember that curve is a relatively new technique. For many tests we use (e.g., the -test) we firstp- t
perform assumption checks. In the case of the t-test, we check the normality assumption. If data isn’t
normally distributed, we cannot trust the conclusions from a -test. I would severely doubt whether we cant
trust the conclusion from this curve. Regardless of whether the curve tells us there is evidential valuep- p-
or not, the curve doesn’t look like a ‘normal value distribution’. Consider the curve analysis as anp- p- p-
overall F-test for an interaction. The curve tells us there is an effect, but if we then perform the simplep-
effects (looking at values between 0.00-0.01, and between 0.01-0.02) our predictions about what thesep-
effects look like is not confirmed. Again, this is just my own interpretation of the curve test, and it will bep-
useful to see how this test develops. For now, I just want to conclude it is debatable whether the
conclusion there is an effect has passed the curve test for evidential value (I would say it has not), andp-
passing the test is not immediately a guarantee there is evidential value. 
 
 Estimating the true effect size with p-curve and p-uniform.
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 Estimating the true effect size with p-curve and p-uniform.
 
Robbie van Aert, Marcel van Assen, and Jelte Wicherts were kind enough to share a recent commentary
article that is under review (“Three reservations on curve for meta-analysis: A comment on Simonsohn,p-
Nelson, and Simmons (2014)”. In this article, they examine the performance of uniform and curvep- p-
when there is variability in the effect size estimates. Their abstract: 
 
“Because evidence of publication bias in psychology is overwhelming, it is important to develop techniques
that correct meta-analytic estimates for publication bias. Simonsohn, Nelson, and Simmons (2014) show
that curve and the methodology on which it is based have great promise for providing accuratep-
meta-analytic estimates in the presence of publication bias. However, we show that curve behavesp-
erratically in some situations. Moreover, we show and explain that, as opposed to statements in
Simonsohn . (2014), curve overestimates effect size under moderate to large heterogeneity, andet al p-
may yield unpredictable bias when researchers employ hacking . We therefore conclude that estimatesp-
of curve and uniform (van Assen, van Aert, and Wicherts, 2014), a method based on the samep- p-
principles but differing from curve in implementation, should be interpreted cautiously in case ofp-
evidence of heterogeneous effect sizes or extensive hacking. Finally, we suggest ways to improve thep-
accuracy of curve and uniform” p- p-
 
We need to know how much heterogeneity there is in the meta-analysis. Regrettably, the authors make no
attempt to share or explain the heterogeneity in the manuscript. Please provide an index of the
heterogeneity (e.g., ) in every performed meta-analysis. Furthermore the author should attempt toI2
explain this heterogeneity – they perform subsample analyses in their manuscript, but it is uncertain
whether or which subsamples differ. Is the difference between slow-thinking and fast-thinking paradigms
explaining the heterogeneity?  
If my meta-analysis is correct, heterogeneity in the overall analysis is substantial:  
Quantifying heterogeneity: 
tau^2 = 0.0056; H = 1.31 [1.16; 1.49]; I^2 = 42.1% [25.4%; 55.1%] 
 
Test of heterogeneity: 
      Q d.f.  value p-
 153.77   89 < 0.0001 
 
This has consequences for the use of curve and uniform to estimate effect sizes.  p- p-
The authors state that: ‘Simonsohn . (2014b) state that the accuracy of their effect-size estimate “doeset al
not rely on homogeneity of sample size or effect size. In all cases, curve is accurate and the otherp-
methods are not (p. 670).” This will without a doubt not be the first time a researcher has made a slightly
boisterous claim about his own recently developed statistical technique that turns out to be false, and I
don’t think the authors need to rub this in by providing a direct quote. I’m confident future studies will point
our heterogeneity is a problem. I observed this myself on my blog (
) and Aert  (underhttp://daniellakens.blogspot.nl/2014/09/publication-bias-in-psychology-putting.html et al
review) provide more evidence for this. From Aert : et al
“The other columns, however, show that both curve and uniform overestimate the mean populationp- p-
effect size of .397 for moderate to large heterogeneity, and that this bias increases with larger
heterogeneity.” 
and 
“However, presently we do not yet recommend estimating effect size with curve or uniform when therep- p-
is evidence of moderate to large heterogeneity, or when there are methodological, psychometric, or
substantive reasons to expect effects to be relatively heterogeneous.” 
Although the manuscript by Aert  is still under review, the take home message should be that bothet al
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Although the manuscript by Aert  is still under review, the take home message should be that bothet al
types of tests can overestimate the true effect size. The statement by the authors that ‘This implies that the
higher estimate of .20 for the true effect size in our database is the correct one’ is completely unwarranted
and should be removed. The authors should instead simply rely on the statistical technique that, according
to our current understanding, is the most reliable, which is the PET estimate, as far as I am aware. curveP-
and uniform are promising techniques, but it is too early to use these techniques to argue for a true effectp-
in this meta-analysis. 
Remember that almost all tests for publication bias work as a sensitivity test under many circumstances.
That is, when they indicate problems (such as indicated by the curve analysis and the PET-analysis) wep-
can be pretty sure there are real problems, but if they show there is an effect, we can hardly be certain a
true effect exists. This is regrettable, but an inevitable consequence of publication bias. 
 The presence of bias
In the literature, a lot has been said about the fact that the low-powered studies reported in Bem (2011)
strongly suggest there are an additional number of unreported experiments, or that the effect size
estimates were artificially inflated by hacking (see Francis, 2012). The authors mention the followingp-
when discussing the possibility that there is a file-drawer (page 9):  
“In his own discussion of potential file-drawer issues, Bem (2011) reported that they arose most acutely in
his two earliest experiments (on retroactive habituation) because they required extensive preexperiment
pilot testing to select and match pairs of photographs and to adjust the number and timing of the repeated
subliminal stimulus exposures. Once these were determined, however, the protocol was “frozen” and the
formal experiments begun. Results from the first experiment were used to rematch several of the
photographs used for its subsequent replication. In turn, these two initial experiments provided data
relevant for setting the experimental procedures and parameters used in all the subsequent experiments.
As Bem explicitly stated in his article, he omitted one exploratory experiment conducted after he had
completed the original habituation experiment and its successful replication.” 
This is not sufficient. The power for his studies is too low to have observed the number of low valuesp-
reported in Bem (2011) without having a much more substantial file-drawer, or hacking. It simply is notp-
possible, and I will not accept vague statements about what has been reported. Where I would normally
give researchers the benefit of the doubt (our science is built on this, to a certain extent) I cannot do this
when there is a clear statistical indication that something is wrong. I also want to point out that, in addition
to a high frequency of low values, the effect size estimates provided by Dr Bem are twice as large as thep-
overall meta-analytic effect size estimate (see meta-analysis performed only on Dr Bem’s data below): 
 
The funnel plot looks like this: 
 
Both the average effect size by Dr Bem, the number of significant results despite low power, and the funnel
plot lead to a single conclusion: I cannot trust the effect sizes in this set of studies. The signs of bias are
clear. Note that my conclusions about the presence of bias are further strengthened by the PET analysis I
have reported above which indicated there is no real effect of Psi after controlling for publication bias. The
lack of an effect in the PET analysis remains true even after excluding all data contributed by Dr. Bem (in
other words, publication bias is common and not unique to the work by Dr. Bem). However, Dr. Bem could
have easily included remaining studies in the meta-analysis, or acknowledged that the performed analyses
in many studies consisted of exploratory analyses with inflated Type 1 error rates. That the authors don’t
question the results reported in Bem (2011) is a clear sign of bias. A similar (but less severe) sign of bias is
the fact that a recent study by Rabeyron (2014, accepted March 2014) with a negative effect size, and
revealing a failed replication of Rabeyron & Watts (2010) is not included in this meta-analysis or discussed
in the manuscript (which was submitted in November 2014). I could go on (there are many stylistic sources
of bias, the abstract being the best example), but I simply think there is more than enough reason to worry. 
I would ask the authors to fill out the PRISMA statement ( )http://www.prisma-statement.org/statement.htm
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I would ask the authors to fill out the PRISMA statement ( )http://www.prisma-statement.org/statement.htm
instead of simply stating they complied to APA reporting standards, and add the PRISMA statement to the
supplementary materials. I’m especially interested in how the authors have dealt with bias – it is clear that
the authors are involved in this research, and have a lot to benefit from a positive outcome of this
meta-analysis, which is known to bias the effect size estimate in meta-analyses.  
Furthermore, although the authors note two individuals have independently coded the results, it was rather
easy for me to identify many coding errors when calculating effect sizes (Lakens, 2014). I looked at only a
subset of the studies, and not even very critically at those. That I nevertheless observed many errors leads
me to the recommendation to contact a statistician, and ask this statistician to check all analyses. 
I think the manuscript would have been better (but also have lead to completely opposite conclusions)
when the authors would have asked someone with sufficient expertise to perform a meta-analysis to join
the research team. Given that this manuscript has been going through the review process for a long time,
and errors are still being discovered, I think additional checks on the data extraction and the performed
analyses should be performed. Please note that I am not a statistician myself (I would say I know almost
nothing about statistics) such that even my comments here should ideally be confirmed by a true expert. In
case the peer review process for this manuscript would be continued, at the very minimum, it should be
required that a real statistician with expertise in meta-analyses checks all analyses and assists the
researchers in analyzing and reporting the data. I’d also appreciate it if the authors could provide all
articles and raw data necessary to check every calculated effect size included in the meta-analysis in an
online repository. 
I understand the goal of Frontiers is to help authors improve their manuscript (I am an editor at Frontiers
myself). However, in this instance, I believe the quality of the work is too low for this to be a fruitful
approach, and I lack the confidence that the current authors will be able to produce a meta-analysis that is
of sufficient quality and adequately addresses the bias that is so clearly present in this manuscript.  
I feel that publishing this would hurt the scientific study of psi. For this research area to be taken seriously
be scientists, it should make every attempt to be free from bias. I know many researchers in this field,
among others Dr Tressoldi, are making every attempt to meet the highest possible standards, for example
by publishing pre-registered studies (e.g., 
). I think this is the true way forwardhttps://koestlerunit.wordpress.com/study-registry/registered-studies/
(but I also think it is telling us something that if replications are performed, even by the original authors
(e.g., Rabyeron, 2014) these studies consistently fail to replicate the original results). Publishing a biased
meta-analysis stating in the abstract there is ‘“decisive evidence” in support of the experimental
hypothesis’ while upon closer scrutiny, the meta-analysis fails to provide any conclusive evidence of the
presence of an effect (let alone support for the hypothesis that psi exists) would be a step back, rather than
a step forward. 
 Conclusion
No researcher should be convinced by this meta-analysis that psi effects exist. I think it is comforting that
PET meta-regression indicates the effect is not reliably different from 0 after controlling for publication bias,
and that curve analyses do not indicate the studies have evidential value. However, even whenp-
statistical techniques would all conclude there is no bias, we should not be fooled into thinking there is no
bias. There most likely will be bias, but statistical techniques are simply limited in the bias they can reliably
indicate.  
My biggest concern with respect to the current meta-analysis is not the small errors in the calculations of
effect sizes or the curve, nor the use of many techniques that are widely believed to be outdated andp-
inaccurate while interpreting these results in favor of the hypothesis, nor the lack of knowledge about some
of the newer statistical techniques the authors use, but primarily the clear bias in the meta-analysis.
Performing meta-analyses on biased data will not lead to reliable conclusions, and I have severe doubts
this bias can be overcome. Psi effects are an important research area in the eyes of the general public.
Let’s not allow low quality work on psi to discredit the status of psi research in particular, and science in
general. Instead, we need better evidence before we attempt to draw meta-analytical conclusions about
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general. Instead, we need better evidence before we attempt to draw meta-analytical conclusions about
whether specific paradigms yield reliable effects.  
If this review process continues (I don’t believe it should, as detailed above), I think that based on my
review, the abstract of the manuscript in a future revision should read as follows: 
In 2011, the Journal of Personality and Social Psychology published a report of nine experiments
purporting to demonstrate that an individual’s cognitive and affective responses can be influenced by
randomly selected stimulus events that do not occur until after his or her responses have already been
made and recorded, a generalized variant of the phenomenon traditionally denoted by the term
precognition (Bem, 2011). To encourage replications, all materials needed to conduct them were made
available on request. We here report a meta-analysis of 90 experiments from 33 laboratories in 14
countries which yielded an overall effect size (Hedges’ g) of 0.09, which after controlling for publication
bias using a PET-meta-regression is reduced to 0.008, which is not reliably different from 0, 95% CI [-0.03;
0.05]. These results suggest positive findings in the literature are an indication of the ubiquitous presence
of publication bias, but cannot be interpreted as support for psi-phenomena. In line with these conclusions,
a p-curve analysis on the 18 significant studies did not provide evidential value for a true effect. We
discuss the controversial status of precognition and other anomalous effects collectively known as psi, and
stress that even if future statistical inferences from meta-analyses would result in an effect size estimate
that is statistically different from zero, the results would not allow for any theoretical inferences about the
existence of psi as long as there are no theoretical explanations for psi-phenomena.
 no competing interestsCompeting Interests:
Reader Comment 09 Nov 2015
, University of Amsterdam, University of Groningen, NetherlandsDick Bierman
FAILED REPLICATION
In this article 'replication' is the most prominent word. The authors write:..... We agree. Rather than
continuing to debate Bem’s original experiments, we seek in our meta-analysis to answer the one question
that most decisively trumps such disputes: Can independent investigators replicate the original
experiments?........
The answer is obviously NO a because a comparison between the 'original' Bem studies and the
replication efforts show that the results the former do significantly deviate from the results in the latter
attempted replication. Although the simple analysis that I performed is not weighted for the different
paradigms win the original study the p of 0.0037 is small enough to survive more subtle evaluations. Also
there are only 2 studies in the whole database that have enough power to expect a significant outcome
given the effect size that Bem now claims. It has been argued that one should never use underpowered
studies in a meta-analysis. (Muncer S, Taylor S, Craigie M. Power dressing and meta-analysis:
incorporating power analysis into meta-analysis. Journal of Advanced Nursing 2002;38(3):274-280.). What
is needed now are d studies to confirm the claimed es of 0.06. I.e the sample sizes should bewell-powere
close to 750. 
Interestingly simulations of questionable research practices for the GF-telepathy paradigm meta analysis
show that the best explanation of the database is obtained if the originally claimed effect size of ~0.17 is
reduced to ~0.06-0.07, the same value as now is claimed on the basis of these 'retrocausal'
studies.(Bierman and Spottiswoode, in press)
 No competing interests were disclosed.Competing Interests:
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Reader Comment 02 Nov 2015
, UCL Experimental Psychology & Institute of Cognitive Neuroscience, UKD. Sam Schwarzkopf
I have read several versions of this manuscript before. A review by Daniel Lakens (published on his blog: 
) identifiedhttp://daniellakens.blogspot.co.uk/2015/04/why-meta-analysis-of-90-precognition.html
indications that publication bias may skew these results. I leave it up to the reader to judge in how far his
comments have been addressed in this new version.
I want to comment on a separate issue: the discussion of how Bayesian evidence is used to update one's
belief about a finding (see paragraph starting with 'An opportunity to calculate...' in General Discussion).
The authors rightly argue that the Bayes Factor is to be interpreted as evidence that the experimenter or
reader can use to update their guestimate whether or not precognition is real. They say that skeptics of
"Psi" (in this case specifically a study by Wagenmakers et al., 2011) have a very strong prior (10^20)
against the existence of Psi and that even their "decisive" Bayes Factor is insufficient to shift that belief to
convince them otherwise. Even after all this the skeptics' posterior odds are tilted far away from accepting
the existence of Psi effects. (At this point I would like to point out a great blog post by Alexander Etz
illustrating the distinction between statistical evidence and drawing a conclusion: 
)http://alexanderetz.com/2015/11/01/evidence-vs-conclusions/
The authors say "Clearly psi-proponents have their work cut out for them." What they do not say is what
their prior belief is. Clearly, as self-identified "psi-proponents", they must set their prior odds to be
somewhere in favour of Psi. Everybody is entitled to their own priors but some priors are probably more
defensible than others. As I have repeatedly argued, not only in the context of Psi research but also in
general terms, researchers should take into account the scientific plausibility of the effects they observe.
They should predict what kinds of effect sizes are likely a priori and whether the observed effects are
consistent with these predictions. I emphathise with the notion that this is hard in Psi research because the
theoretical basis of these effects is vague at best. However, I also think it is particularly pertinent for claims
of this magnitude.
And it is not an insurmountable problem. If the researchers believe in some quantum mechanistic effect or
whatever kind of time-symmetric phenomenon they should come up with a prediction of what kinds of
statistical effect sizes this is likely to produce in experiments of this kind (for instance, 12-18 trials with
probability 0.5 per condition per subject in Bem's experiment 1). My hunch is that the expected effect size
is several orders of magnitude smaller than the already miniscule effect size estimated by this
meta-analysis.
Another approach could be to take the estimated effect size from this meta-analysis and try to simulate
how this would manifest in the real world if the effect were true. If 100 people will make correct guesses for
emotional events 51-53% of the time, how will this impact everyday events, such as profits by casinos?
You'd think if a precognition effect were so easily measurable as these experiments imply we should see a
considerable impact of that on the economy and the general survival of our species. Psi research is often
motivated by anecdotal evidence of weird "anomalous" phenomena, like precognitive dreams or knowing
the phone will ring with an important call just before it happens. How frequent are those events really and
how consistent is that rate with cognitive biases compared to actual precognition?
The answers to these questions could actually inform educated prior odds that can tell us how likely it is
that effects such as the ones observed in these experiments are really due to precognition. I don't know
what the answer is but I think we can be confident that the odds against it are stronger than 1 to 1. In the
absence of more informed prior odds, I think 10^20 is a pretty good bet.
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absence of more informed prior odds, I think 10^20 is a pretty good bet.
 I am extremely skeptical of the claim that precognition exists - but if we announcedCompeting Interests:
our prior skepticism as competing interests we should declare conflicts of interest for every study we
author or review which is a reductio ad absurdum. I hope I have sufficiently explained my reasoning for
believing as I do.
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